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We live in a moment of intense preoccupation with both marriage and federalism, one 
that is likely to persist well beyond the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell  
v. Hodges. The decision served to reify marriage as a site of enormous cultural 
significance, an appropriate institution within which to fight over social meaning and 
its reflection in law. These battles are fought state by state, against a backdrop of 
unprecedented geographic mobility, raising profound questions not only about how 
states relate to their own citizens, but how states relate to each other. If it is true that 
states have an interest in marriages they have created, an idea often invoked but less 
frequently examined, then interstate marriage recognition is a matter not only of 
individual rights but also of state sovereignty. Yet the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the 
constitutional command that is seemingly most suited to managing marriage 
federalism, has never been called into action. 
 
This Article first suggests that this warrants explanation and then endeavors to 
provide one. It offers an account of contingent doctrinal evolution, demonstrating that 
the work the Clause might do in regulating interstate marriage recognition has so far 
been done by other doctrines. But it also explains why the Clause might nonetheless 
be useful for the marriage controversies of the future. The anti-animus principles that 
drove marriage equality forward are highly dynamic; they reflect and respond to 
social change in an iterative process that is neither linear, nor predictable, nor 
instantaneous. While this unfolds for any given marriage controversy, over a period 
that might take decades, we would advance our commitment to faithful unionsboth 
marital and nationalby developing an interstate recognition scheme with 
constitutional parameters. 
 * Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article takes on a puzzle in the ongoing constitutionalization of 
marriage.1 Marriage has become one of the central civil rights issues of 
our time, but the most intense national controversies over state marriage 
policy seem to deflect rather than facilitate resolution of interstate 
recognition issues. During the period that any given marriage 
controversy wends its way through state and federal courts and 
legislatures, yielding a patchwork of divergent state marriage laws, the 
question of interstate recognition is a very pressing one.2 Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court has never explained whether Article IV’s Full Faith 
and Credit Clause requires states to recognize the marriage acts of other 
states. Instead, when a controversy over marriage reaches a certain point 
of national salience, the Court (after waiting it out for a while) goes 
 1. Numerous scholars have explored the idea that marriage and family law have become 
constitutionalized. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L. Q. 
529, 529 (2008) (noting that “[a]mong the forces transforming American family law over the last fifty 
years, perhaps none has been more salient than the field’s ‘constitutionalization.’”); see also Mary 
Anne Case, Feminist Constitutionalism and the Constitutionalism of Marriage, in FEMINIST 
FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MARRIAGE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (Beverly 
Baines et al. eds., 2012). 
 2. Other commentators have capably explained this urgency. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, 
Same-sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 6 
(2005) (explaining why it is “essential that we face squarely the arguments on both sides of this debate 
about whether states have a constitutional obligation to recognize same-sex marriages validly 
performed elsewhere.”); Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of  
Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005).   
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directly to the substantive Fourteenth Amendment principles: what do 
Equal Protection and Due Process require of states in issuing marriage 
licenses? The Court has declined to impose any Article IV parameters on 
how states relate to each other during times of pervasive disagreement 
over the proper contours of the marriage relationship.3 
That is not to say that this would be an easy or straightforward 
endeavor, as those familiar with choice of law doctrine will appreciate. 
Scholars in this field have long asserted, over some vigorous and 
persuasive objections,4 that the Full Faith and Credit Clause has no 
bearing on the interstate recognition of marriage.5 Distilled to its 
essential elements, the thesis is that in spite of its plain text, the clause’s 
operational scope has historically been limited to the interstate 
recognition of judgments, and that the management of interstate 
marriage conflicts falls to ordinary, non-constitutional choice of law 
principles.6 As one commentator has described, adherents of the 
 3. This is made all the more perplexing given the Court’s emphasis on the importance of its role 
in enforcing federalism principles. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20 (1997); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding a nationwide gun control act was an overreach of 
Congressional powers). To be sure, the Court has recently been more vocal about vertical federalism 
principles, the enforcement of the boundary between federal and state power. But it has also 
emphasized the importance of horizontal federalism, the appropriate management of interstate 
relationships, to the constitutional design. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 
439 (1943) (describing the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a “nationally unifying force” transforming 
the states from “independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created 
under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others . . . .”).  
 4. See, e.g., Habib A. Balian, Note, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to 
Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397 (1995); J. Stephen Clark, Conflicts Originalism: The “Original 
Content” of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Compulsory Choice of Marriage Law, 118 W. VA. 
L. REV. 547, 549 (2015) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been left seriously underenforced as a 
constitutional constraint on state choice of law.”); Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be 
Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of 
Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. 
Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 584 (1993); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of 
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1967 (1997) (asserting 
that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits states from selectively discriminating in choice of law 
based on judgments about the desirability or obnoxiousness of other states’ policies.”). Kramer’s work 
is especially interesting in retrospect, having been written in the very early stages of legislative activity 
and ballot initiatives that targeted same-sex marriage for special rules of nonrecognition.  
 5. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 363 (2005) [hereinafter Borchers, The 
Essential Irrelevance]; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full 
Faith and Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1981); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional 
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith 
and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981). Arguments that 
states must recognize valid marriages performed in other states were treated in this literature as a kind 
of rookie mistake: “It always worries me a little when the Conflict of Laws suddenly seems interesting. 
When outsiders begin to visit this little corner of the legal universe, the results usually are not good.” 
Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-
Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 147 (1998). 
 6. As neatly captured in one rendition: “Only judgments are entitled to near automatic 
recognition . . . a marriage is not a ‘judgment’ (at least of the relevant kind), but rather, it is a state 
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conventional wisdom project an air of certainty about this premise that 
is outright disdainful for suggestions to the contrary.7 
If it is “preposterous”8 to consider the application of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause to the interstate recognition of marriage, no one told 
the Supreme Court. During the oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
the justices repeatedly asked counsel to do exactly that. Justice Scalia, 
inverting the conventional wisdom sketched out above, proclaimed that 
it was the Full Faith and Credit Clause, rather than the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “that actually seems to be relevant.”9 Justice Roberts 
emphasized the lack of precedent directly considering the marriage 
question and pressed counsel to identify any case that could be said to 
dispose of the possibility that marriage licenses were entitled to Full 
Faith and Credit.10 
In a high profile, ideologically fraught case that few expected to yield 
any real surprises, this line of questioning was unexpected and 
interesting. Had the conflicts scholars been wrong to conclude so 
forcefully that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not apply to marriage? 
Would the conservative justices find themselves bound by the text of the 
Full Faith and Credit clause to order the recognition of same-sex 
marriages? The moment passed with little lasting consequence, however, 
when the majority ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon 
every state an obligation to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
completely overshadowing the question of interstate recognition. None 
of the dissenters who objected to the majority’s view of Equal Protection 
and Due Process suggested that they would have required Ohio or 
Tennessee to recognize valid same-sex marriages from other states 
pursuant to the demands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It was 
difficult to know who, exactly, had been vindicated by the Justices’ 
intense but short-lived interest in the relationship between marriage and 
the Full Faith and Credit clause. 
The Full Faith and Credit clause’s proper application to interstate 
marriage recognition thus remains unresolved, perhaps restoring to 
primacy the conflicts scholars’ assessment that it is largely irrelevant. 
This supposed irrelevance, however, continues to be a bit puzzling, 
licensed and sanctioned arrangement entered into under the umbrella of a statute. A marriage, 
therefore, is a sister-state public act, and historically the Supreme Court has not required states to give 
full faith and credit to such acts.” WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND 
CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 125–26 (2005). 
 7. Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to Same-Sex Marriage?: 
Toward a Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95 (2014).  
 8. Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 479 (2005) 
(“The subject of same-sex marriage has produced a seemingly endless set of preposterous ideas about 
why the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to give effect to marriages performed in other 
states.”). 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). 
 10. Id. at 28, 35–36. 
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especially in light of the skepticism with which it was received by the 
justices during oral argument in Obergefell. One need not be a  
full-throated textualist to observe that the text of the clause is difficult to 
reconcile with the meager force of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as 
historically applied to marriages.11 It bears some emphasis in a 
constitutional culture such as ours, where textualism still has such 
purchase, that this rewriting of the clause is particularly heavy-handed, 
rendering null two of the enumerated items in a list of three.12 On the 
other hand, constitutional doctrines are replete with departures from 
textualism, and the Constitution itself includes some provisions for 
which the literal reading would be more or less absurd.13 As has been 
noted, a literal reading of the Full Faith and Credit clause might be 
similar, in that requiring a state to give effect to all “Acts” of a sister state 
would eviscerate its authority to regulate in divergent ways.14 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has imposed a rather minimal constitutional obligation 
when it comes to state choice of law decisions in cases involving tort 
liability, contract enforcement, and workplace regulation.15 Marriage, 
however, presents some distinctive interstate recognition questions that 
are not necessarily answered by this line of cases.16 The proper resolution 
of the question is not obvious, and there are reasons to wonder how the 
Court would (and should) ultimately resolve it. What this Article seeks to 
explain is why the Court has never done so. How has this gone 
unanswered for so long? To state the obvious, it is not for lack of 
opportunity. 
In this Article, I seek to explain why these questions remain 
unanswered after such prolonged and intensive focus on the 
constitutional implications of state marriage policy. Questions of 
 11. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 290 (1992) (explaining the operation of the 
Clause as to interstate recognition of judgments, and observing that “[a]s a simple matter of 
constitutional text, the Clause must have the same meaning with respect to rules of law.”). 
 12. Although one might accept that “Public Acts” includes the statutes of sister states, 
acknowledging the plain meaning of the text, and yet still posit that the “faith” or “credit” due to a 
sister state statute is different than what is due to a sister state judgment; in other words, that statutes 
are not read out of the Clause but simply require a different type of regard.  
 13. For a favorite example, see Amar’s discussion of vice presidents presiding over their own 
impeachment trials. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 10–11 (2012).  
 14. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1468, 1503 (2007) (“Read literally, the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggests ‘the absurd result that, 
wherever the conflict [between different states’ laws] arises, the statute of each state must be enforced 
in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.’”) (quoting Ala. Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident 
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)). 
 15. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 43 (describing the Court’s approach in these 
cases as one of “minimal scrutiny.”).  
 16. It is a status determination with an utterly unique set of ramifications for individual rights 
and obligations. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2, at 40.  
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interstate marriage recognition implicate a tangled mix of principles 
drawn from different doctrines. Thinking about marriage federalism 
requires an understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, layered 
upon “ordinary” (by which I mean non-constitutional) choice of law 
principles, operating against a backdrop of Due Process and Equal 
Protection guarantees.17 
A conventional and perfectly valid appraisal of these doctrines 
would take them in isolation, noting that they serve different purposes, 
were borne out of different questions, and are appropriate to raise in 
different fact patterns.18 These doctrines are not interdependent in any 
formal sensewhat states choose to recognize under their ordinary 
choice of law rules operates independently of what they are obligated to 
do under the Full Faith and Credit clause,19 and of course their 
obligations under that clause are not contingent upon their obligations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the reverse. So it might violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment to discriminate against same-sex couples in 
the provision of marriage licenses even though it does not violate the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to refuse to recognize marriage licenses from 
other states. Conversely, it is possible to imagine a universe in which the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause required states to recognize marriage 
licenses from sister states even where there was no Fourteenth 
Amendment obligation to issue the same sort of license in the first 
instance.20 It is thus entirely accurate to conceive of these doctrines as 
distinct and independentnot reliant on, nor substitutes for, one 
another. 
This Article offers a different perspective, beginning with the 
observation that all three of these doctrines are tools that in some way 
serve to solve the social problem writ large: how to manage interstate 
marriage recognition in a morally pluralistic, structurally federalist 
 17. And, as I will explore later in the Article, it raises even broader trans-substantive questions 
about horizontal federalism and the role of Congress in resolving interstate conflicts.  
 18. William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman, for example, posit that the “essence” of the 
Due Process clause “is fairness to the individual, while the heart of full faith and credit is ensuring that 
each state respects the rights of other states.” REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 39.  
 19. Justice Jackson cautioned against the temptation of treating the doctrines as interchangeable:  
In considering claims of foreign law for faith and credit courts of course find conflict of laws 
a relevant and enlightening body of experience and authority to provide analogies. But while 
the American law of conflicts is a somewhat parallel and contemporaneous development 
with the law of faith and credit, they also are quite independent evolutions, are based on 
contrary basic assumptions, and at times support conflicting results. We must beware of 
transposing conflicts doctrines into the law of the Constitution. 
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM.  
L. REV. 1, 30 (1945). 
 20. I acknowledge here the distinct contention that a couple validly married in one jurisdiction 
has a Fourteenth Amendment right, sounding either in due process or equal protection, to the 
continued validity of their marriage. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) 
Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2012). 
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system with an increasingly mobile and inter-connected population.21 
These doctrines are not deployed or developed in isolation, and this 
Article will argue that what we are witnessing is a phenomenon of 
contingent doctrinal evolution, whereby seemingly independent 
doctrines develop or stagnate in response to what is happening in other 
areas of law.22 The expansiveness of the “ordinary” choice of law 
principles and the expanding scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection for marriage decisionmaking have crowded out the Full Faith 
and Credit question. In a landscape where one has always been generous 
and the other is becoming more so, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has 
little to do23not because it is textually or conceptually inapt, but 
because its practical, real-world work is being done by other doctrines. 
This Article describes this phenomenon and explores its 
implicationsfor rights, for federalism, and for both marital and 
national unions. 
Part I briefly reviews the debate over whether the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause should apply to interstate marriage recognition. It provides 
an overview of the scholarly literature and a detailed look at the line of 
inquiry pursued by the Justices during the Obergefell argument, 
showcasing how profoundly unsettled the question continues to be. Part 
II explores why the issue remains unresolved, introducing and 
elaborating upon the concept of contingent doctrinal evolution. It 
explains that “ordinary” choice of law principles foster the recognition of 
most interstate marriages, making it unnecessary in the vast majority of 
instances to determine a state’s constitutional obligations under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. As to those marriages that have fallen outside 
the scope of these decidedly pro-recognition rulesinter-racial and 
same-sex marriages chief among themwe have on the other hand an 
increasingly robust set of Fourteenth Amendment principles working to 
invalidate exclusionary marriage policies predicated on animus. Part II 
also highlights the challenging structural questions presented by 
Congress’s role as interstate relations manager, showing that these issues 
complicate the development of interstate recognition principles 
grounded in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Part III considers whether, 
 21. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After Lawrence  
v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1274 (2004) (“The Jim Crow judges were horrifyingly wrong about 
many things, but they did understand the problem of moral pluralism in a federal system, and we can 
learn something important from the solutions that they devised.”). 
 22. For an example from another area of constitutional law, consider one scholar’s observation 
that there was little need to determine the boundaries of Congress’s power to tax during the 60 years 
that it had virtually unlimited power under the Commerce Clause. See Barry Cushman, NFIB  
v. Sebelius and the Transformation of the Taxing Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 161 (2013). 
 23. One scholar posits that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “sits there, seemingly with nothing to 
dobecause it has never been asked to do anything.” Sanders, supra note 7, at 101 (emphasis in 
original). I concur with and draw from his capable analysis but offer a different explanation for the 
Clause’s apparent powerlessness.  
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in light of these phenomena, there will be work remaining for Full Faith 
and Credit in future marriage controversies. It concludes that the answer 
is yes, explaining that unconstitutional animus is not a terrain with fixed 
boundariesit is contested, evolving, and responsive to social change. 
Most importantly, such animus is easier to see in retrospect than while 
social and legal change is unfolding. While the chronology of marriage 
equality seems to reinforce the assumption that we can expect the 
Fourteenth Amendment to do most of the work in policing state marriage 
policy, we might nonetheless find it useful to call upon the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause while the Fourteenth Amendment principles are being 
worked out. 
I.  THE ROLE OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN INTERSTATE  
MARRIAGE RECOGNITION 
A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The outline of the problem is familiar: a couple gets married in one 
state, then moves to another.24 Their union features some quality that 
would render them ineligible to receive a marriage license in the second 
state were they seeking to wed there in the first instance, but they are not 
seeking the issuance of a new license. They simply seek to have the 
second state recognize what the first state has already done, to give effect 
to the status they have already achieved. What are the obligations of the 
second state to honor an existing marriage license that it would have 
refused to issue? 
It seems that the Full Faith and Credit Clause pertains to this very 
question.25 The text could hardly be more apt, ordaining that: “Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Surely a state-issued marriage 
license qualifies as a “public Act,” or at least a “Record?” Perusing the 
minutia of state marriage procedure confirms the intuition, revealing all 
manner of detail regarding the state’s matrimonial record keeping.26 And 
 24. As we will explore in much greater depth, the “migratory” couple described here is different 
in profoundly important ways than a couple contracting an “evasive” marriage.  
 25. Kramer, supra note 4, at 1976 (the clause “looks on its face as if it were written for precisely 
this sort of problem.”).  
 26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-109 (2017). Notwithstanding this apparent fit, however, FFC 
scholars have asserted that: 
[T]he meaning of the term full faith and credit shifts as the focus changes from judicial 
proceedings and acts to records. To give full faith and credit to another state’s judicial 
proceedings is to give them preclusive effect according to the law of the rendering 
state. . . . By contrast, to give full faith and credit to ‘records’ means simply to admit them 
routinely into evidence in the courts of the forum. 
REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 13 (emphasis omitted). The fuller context reveals the 
assumption that the records in question are judicial records. Reynolds and Richman treat the “records” 
component (in combination with Congress’s implementing statute) as the mechanism by which courts 
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when the issue of same-sex marriage was brought into the national 
spotlight by litigation in Hawaii,27 reporters and commentators opined 
that the Full Faith and Credit clause would require other states to 
recognize such marriages.28 
But Professor Andrew Koppelman, in what is perhaps the definitive 
modern guide to interstate marriage conflicts, described this idea as a 
“fundamental misconception.”29 The chapter devoted to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause proclaims the clause’s “irrelevance” to interstate 
marriage recognition, using the same striking language as an article on 
interstate marriage recognition from the previous year.30 The assertion 
is defended by noting the dearth of judicial decisions imposing full faith 
and credit obligations on states refusing to recognize out of state 
marriages. Koppelman observes that “there is not a single judicial 
decision that holds that full faith and credit requires states to recognize 
marriages that violate their own public policies concerning who may 
marry.”31 Instead, he explains, the force of the clause has historically been 
admit and authenticate evidence of what a sister court has rendered.  
 27. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
 28. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME-SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE 
LINES 117 (2006) (describing such assertions as “feckless.”). It is worth noting that for scholars and 
advocates sympathetic to the cause of marriage equality, as Koppelman certainly was, and therefore 
eager to dispel the panic that accompanied the developments in Hawaii and Massachusetts, there may 
have been strategic reasons to assure observers that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not spring 
into action. See, e.g., Jay Michaelson, An Often-Overlooked Clause in the Constitution Points the Way 
to Same-sex Marriage, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2013, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/02/an-often-overlooked-clause-in-the-constitution 
-points-the-way-to-same-sex-marriage.html (opining that conservatives opposed to same-sex 
marriage were invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a “scare tactic.”). 
 29. KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 118.  
 30. Koppelman criticized the media coverage of the same-sex marriage controversy for 
“fecklessly” repeating “the claim that the full faith and credit clause will require every state to recognize 
same-sex marriages.” KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 117. Such claims, it should be noted, were heard 
in no less hallowed halls than the United States Congress, as Mark Strasser captures nicely in his article 
on DOMA: “Members of Congress apparently feared that Hawaii would recognize same-sex marriage, 
and that domiciliaries of other states would go to Hawaii, marry their same-sex partners, and then 
return to their domiciles demanding that their marriages be recognized.” Mark Strasser, Windsor, 
Federalism, and the Future of Marriage Litigation, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 7 (2013); see 
also id. at 7 n.64 (citing 142 CONG. REC. H7480-05, H7490) (Rep. Canady): 
The idea of the gay rights legal advocacy community is that they will have same-sex 
marriages recognized in the State of Hawaii, and then folks will go there from around the 
country, be married under the laws of the State of Hawaii, and then go back to where they 
came from and attempt to use the full faith and credit clause to force those States to which 
they have returned to recognize the legality of that same-sex union contracted in the State 
of Hawaii.  
(citing 142 CONG. REC. H7480-05, H7486) (Rep. Buyer) (“When one State wants to move towards the 
recognition of same-sex marriages, it is wrong. The full faith and credit of the Constitution would force 
States like Indiana to abide by it. We as a Federal Government have a responsibility to act, and we will 
act.”); see also Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance, supra note 5; Whitten, supra note 8, at 486.  
 31. KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 118. The explanatory footnote, however, tells a slightly more 
complicated story, listing counter examples. Id. at 185 n.11. Koppelman notes that these exceptions 
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limited to judgments. Marriage licenses, of course, no matter how 
intricate the procedures used to formalize the union, simply cannot be 
categorized as judgments. While states are constitutionally obligated to 
give effect to the judgments of sister state courts, they are otherwise free, 
for the most part, to apply their own choice of law principles to any given 
dispute, with the result of choosing their own state’s substantive law.32 
Koppelman and other conflicts scholars cite landmark cases such as 
Sun Oil and Allstate for the principle that a state may apply its own law 
to a dispute if the state “had a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its 
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”33 Scholars often cite 
Nevada v. Hall for the proposition that states may refuse to apply a sister 
state’s law when doing so would violate the forum state’s “legitimate 
public policy.”34 Nevada v. Hall, it must be noted, was a personal injury 
case concerning a state’s authority to apply its own damages law to a 
dispute with a sister state defendant, thereby allowing a higher recovery 
against the sister state defendant than the sister state’s own law would 
allow. Similarly, treated as instructive is languagemost recently 
reiterated in a products liability action brought against an automobile 
manufacturerasserting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not 
compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own 
statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent 
to legislate.”35 The use of such cases in this context reveals the pervasive 
and usually unexplained assumption that the recognition of marriages is 
conceptually equivalent to the other choice of law problems that confront 
a court adjudicating a case with interjurisdictional contacts. This 
assumption has proliferated beyond the academic literature, showing up 
were limited to common law marriages, which he describes as presenting a formal rather than 
substantive objection. But common law marriage was on occasion denied recognition on the grounds 
that it was offense to the forum state’s “strong public policy,” suggesting substantive and not just 
technical opposition. See, e.g., Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance, supra note 5, at 354 n.11 (citing 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961)) (refusing to recognize common-law 
marriage because it would violate strong public policy of the forum). Another commentator identifies 
one case in which a court applied full faith and credit principles to interstate marriage recognition, but 
that case seemed to involve a common law marriage adjudicated to judgment. Balian, supra note 4, at 
403 n.27 (citing Ram v. Ramharack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)) (holding that a common-
law marriage validly consummated in another state or jurisdiction can be recognized in New York 
under the doctrine of full faith and credit). 
 32. Note that the inquiry is often phrased to collapse two distinct questions: (1) which choice of 
law methodology does a state use, and is that a fair method when assessed independently of which law 
is ultimately selected; and (2) is it appropriate for a forum state to apply its own law? 
 33. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). Cited in Koppelman, supra note 28, at 
118 n.18 and REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 27.  
 34. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979). 
 35. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
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in lower court rulings,36 opinion letters,37 and other discussions of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause’s application to interstate marriage 
recognition.38 As will be explored in further detail, whether this 
assumption will bear out remains an open question. 
In any event, it is against this backdrop that eminent choice of law 
scholars have concluded that questions of interstate marriage 
recognition are choice of law problems, not constitutional ones; that this 
is a realm in which state law reigns supreme and pretty much 
unhindered. William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman, for example, 
describe it as “quite unlikely that the Supreme Court [would] strike down 
any decision rendered by a state court that has conscientiously applied 
any of the dominant choice of law methodologies,” noting the Court’s 
“veneration of choice of law traditions” and the “ease” with which it 
“manufactures” the requisite contacts.39 
When it comes to the recognition of out-of-state marriages, the 
choice of law tradition most prominent among the states40 is the “place 
of celebration” rule, or lex loci contractus.41 The essential premise of the 
place of celebration rule is that a marriage which is valid where it was 
performed or celebrated will be treated as valid everywhere, unless it 
violates the “strong public policy” of the state that had “the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the 
marriage.”42 Aside from the obvious fact that states can choose, revise, or 
abandon choice of law methodologies at will, it is this exception, which 
 36. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 37. See, e.g., Richard S. Madaleno, Jr., MarriageWhether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That Is 
Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 MD. OP. ATT’Y. GEN. 3 (2010). 
 38. As, for example, during the interstate recognition portion of the Obergefell oral argument. See 
supra note 9.  
 39. For an overview of these dominant methodologies, see REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note  
6, at 28. As will be explained infra, there is a more specific method used for marriages.  
 40. Koppelman describes the Restatement approach as extant in “approximately half the states.” 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 86; see also Goldman v. Dithrich, 179 So. 715, 717 (1938) (Brown, J., 
dissenting) (citing to a collection of cases and observing “[t]he general rule is that the validity of a 
marriage is governed by the law of the place of its celebration.”).  
 41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A marriage 
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be 
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”). The state with 
the most significant relationship is typically the state where the couple is domiciled. See KOPPELMAN, 
supra note 28, at 18. Koppelman’s alternate phrasing nicely captures the Second Restatement’s 
requirement that the marriage policy being enforced is that of the state with the most significant 
connection to the couple at the time they are wed: “a marriage valid under the law of the most 
interested state at the time of the marriage is . . . valid everywhere, even if the parties later move to a 
state where that marriage could not have been entered into.” Id. at 86.  
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971). This formulation 
encompasses what is sometimes described as an exception to the place of celebration rule for evasive 
marriages, where the parties went to the place of celebration for the sole purpose of evading their home 
state’s prohibition on their marriage. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 1969.  
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allows states to reject out-of-state marriages on public policy grounds, 
that distinguishes the ironclad rules of Full Faith and Credit from the 
flexibility of state choice of law methodology.43 
Nonetheless, the place of the celebration rule, even with its 
exception for marriages that violate the “strong public policy” of the 
forum state, is typically quite generous in recognizing out of state 
marriages. As one treatise reports, “the overwhelming tendency in 
American conflicts cases is to validate the marriage.”44 For the public 
policy exception to apply, it is not enough that the laws differ, as that 
would categorically be the case whenever a question of interstate 
marriage recognition reached the choice of law stage.45 Rather, a sister 
state’s law must diverge from the forum state’s law in an unusually 
offensive way.46 One leading case, In re May’s Estate, illustrates how 
sparingly courts have historically treated the exception, even in the face 
of a consanguineous relationship from which many contemporary 
observers would still recoil.47 There, the high court of New York applied 
the place of celebration rule, rather than the public policy exception, in 
recognizing a marriage validly contracted in Rhode Island between an 
uncle and half-niecein spite of the fact that such marriages were 
considered incestuous, void, and indeed criminal under New York law.48 
That the court nonetheless declined to invoke the public policy exception, 
proceeding instead to recognize the marriage because it was valid where 
celebrated, shows the exception’s truly limited reach. 
Moreover, under the Restatement formulation, only the state with 
the most significant connection to the spouses, typically the couple’s 
domicile at the time of the marriage, is entitled to invoke a public policy 
exception to refuse recognition.49 A number of states did away with the 
exception altogether, adopting a categorical approach to the place of 
celebration rule modeled on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The 
relevant provision states “All marriages contracted . . . outside this state, 
 43. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233–34 (1998) (full faith and credit permits no 
public policy exception to the recognition of judgments); see also V.L v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 
(2016) (per curiam) (“A State may not disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees 
with the reasoning underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the merits.”).  
 44. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 402 (3d 
ed. 2002).  
 45. See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 743 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
 46. For a discussion of the difficulty in discerning the exact boundaries of the public policy 
exception, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 20–27.  
 47. In re May’s Estate, 14 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).  
 48. Id. at 6–7. 
 49. See Sanders, supra note 7, at 101 (observing that the public policy exception is only supposed 
to apply to evasive marriages, meaning those in which the couple traveled out of their home state for 
the sole purpose of evading their state’s marriage laws). This limitation on the public policy exception 
is not universally observed. See Ghassemi, 998 So.2d at 731 (considering the public policy of the state 
of Louisiana regarding first cousin marriages even though the parties married in Iran and then moved 
to Louisiana).  
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that were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently validated by 
the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicile of 
the parties, are valid in this state.”50 This version of the place of 
celebration rule requires recognition of validly contracted interstate 
marriages without any exception for the forum state’s public policy 
objections. 
The overwhelming generosity of the place of celebration rule over 
the long course of conflicts history is something to which we will return; 
for our immediate purpose, what is essential to understand is that courts 
have invoked the public policy exception, refusing to recognize an out-of-
state marriage, without being reversed by the Supreme Court on grounds 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required recognition even where the 
place of celebration rule did not.51 In this sense, it is quite true that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause has not yet seemed to require interstate 
marriage recognition. To be fair, these cases are well outnumbered by the 
cases in which recognition was granted. Further, in very few (if any) of 
these non-recognition cases was the Court asked to weigh in on the Full 
Faith and Credit question.52 The operative data set, it bears emphasizing, 
is vanishingly small. 
 50. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 210 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’r’s on Unif. State Laws 
1970). The comment specifies that it “expressly fails to incorporate the ‘strong public policy’ exception 
of the Restatement . . . [t]his section will preclude invalidation of many marriages which would have 
been invalidated in the past.” According to one inventory, seventeen states have “essentially similar” 
language. See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are 
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1066–67 (1994). Notably, in the 
years between Baehr and Obergefell, most of these states amended their laws to deny recognition to 
same-sex marriages, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 179 n.24, a phenomenon of profound relevance 
for the animus analysis.  
 51. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961) (refusing to recognize 
common law marriage); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 65 (N.J. 1958) (refusing to recognize 
underage marriage, although it appears that the marriage wasn’t even valid under Indiana law due to 
lack of parental consent (see KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 159 n.11)); Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 
577 (Ala. 1938) (refusing to recognize marriage between one adjudicated guilty of adultery and the 
paramour). Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) is particularly illustrative in that the 
Full Faith and Credit claim was specifically raised and rejected by a federal court considering a habeas 
petition, challenging a Virginia state criminal conviction for an inter-racial marriage validly contracted 
in Washington DC. The district court set forth to assess whether the conviction violated any federal 
constitutional provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment, privileges and immunities, and the 
Full Faith and Credit clause. Id. at 607. As to the latter, the court ruled that even if marriage certificates 
were “public records” within the meaning of the Clause, a proposition the court found “doubtful,” that 
the consequence at most would be to render “indisputable the fact of the marriage and of its legality 
in the place of contract. Id. To give to public records ‘full faith and credit, is to attribute to them positive 
and absolute verity, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them be denied any more than 
in the state where they originated.” What it would not do, the court opined, was “convert the fact of 
validity there into validity here, contrary to the express local law.” Id. For a persuasive rejection of the 
“evidentiary” view of the Clause, see Laycock, supra note 11,  
at 301–05. Nonetheless, the ruling was never reviewed much less overturned by the Supreme Court.  
 52. Certiorari was never sought in any of the cases mentioned in the foregoing footnote.  
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Nonetheless, in view of this history, a number of influential conflicts 
scholars have been quite adamant that “the question of whether or not to 
recognize a foreign marriage has almost always been treated as a 
question of state law.”53 According to Koppelman and concurring 
conflicts scholars, the Full Faith and Credit Clause simply imposes no 
duty on states to recognize another state’s marriage license.54 At the risk 
of being portrayed “as something close to a dimwit,” other scholars 
voiced challenges to the conventional view, emphasized the uniqueness 
of marriage in our legal tradition55 and noted that the absence of case law 
resolving the Full Faith and Credit question meant that the question 
continued to be an open one.56 Indeed, much to everyone’s surprise, 
when it came time to consider the interstate recognition of same-sex 
marriages, the Justices seemed to agree, at least for an hour or so. 
B. A MOMENT OF PROMISE FOR FULL FAITH AND CREDIT? 
When the Supreme Court finally announced that it would consider 
marriage equality for same-sex couples, the questions presented focused 
exclusively on state obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment.57 
Even the second question, which explicitly addressed a state’s obligation 
to recognize existing marriages performed and licensed in other states, 
was phrased to limit the inquiry to recognition obligations arising from 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
principles.58 Yet during oral argument, the Justices quickly signaled their 
interest in the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to questions 
of interstate marriage recognition. Counsel for Respondents opened his 
remarks by asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require 
 53. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance, supra note 5, at 354.  
 54. For a noteworthy critique of the idea that choice of law methodologies lack constitutional 
import, see Laycock, supra note 11. Laycock explains that this position inverts our expectations about 
the relationship between state law and the Constitution: “For most contemporary choice-of-law 
scholars, the Constitution does not control choice of law so much as choice-of-law theory informs the 
meaning of the Constitution. Most of them have little or nothing to say about constitutional text, 
history, or structure.” And yet in Laycock’s own work there is some mitigation for these scholars, as he 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court “has all but abandoned” any effort to identify constitutional 
limitations on state choice of law decisions: “It has never considered a Privileges and Immunities 
Clause challenge to a state choice-of-law rule, and it has removed most of the content from the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.” Laycock, supra note 11, at 257.  
 55. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 7, at 96; see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 44, at 401 
(“The peculiar nature of the family’s legal status . . . creates special conflicts problems.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 2, at 454.  
 57. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (granting petitions for writs of certiorari 
limited to the following questions: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a 
marriage between two people of the same-sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to 
recognize a marriage between two people of the same-sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed 
and performed out-of-state?).  
 58. Id. For further discussion of a state’s Fourteenth Amendment obligations to recognize 
marriage licenses granted in other states, see Sanders, supra 7, at 95. 
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“states with traditional marriage laws to recognize marriages from other 
States between two persons of the same-sex.”59 Justice Scalia’s 
immediate (and inimitable) response: 
What about Article IV? I’m so glad to be able to quote a portion of the 
Constitution that actually seems to be relevant. ‘Full faith and credit shall 
be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
of every other State.’ Now, why doesn’t that apply?60 
In the colloquy that followed, Respondents’ counsel hewed to the 
conventional wisdom outlined above, arguing that a state’s obligation 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause was primarily to recognize sister 
state judgments.61 Justice Scalia pressed counsel on the clause’s plain 
text, “Public acts? It would include the act of marrying people, I 
assume.”62 
Counsel resisted the proposition, and Justice Scalia asked him to 
confirm his view that “there’s nothing in the Constitution” that requires 
a state to recognize a marriage from a sister state.63 Counsel 
characterized that as “essentially correct,” prompting a skeptical  
one-word response from Justice Scalia: “Really?”64 Digging in, counsel 
took a rather absolutist position, affirming the proposition that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause would permit a state to recognize only those 
marriages conducted under its own laws.65 Justice Scalia once again 
expressed skepticism, at which point the other Justices joined in the 
exchange.66 Justice Roberts asked counsel which case he would cite for 
the proposition that a state had no obligation to recognize marriages 
from other states. Counsel replied initially with some confusion, and 
eventually cited Nevada v. Hall.67 Counsel drew from Nevada v. Hall the 
principle that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State 
to apply another State’s law in violation of its own legitimate public 
policy.”68 In doing so, counsel implicitly assumed that a marriage license 
from another jurisdiction should be treated in the same fashion as 
another state’s statutory laws, a point that would not be explored until 
later in the argument. 
 59. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 26. 
 60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 26. 
 61. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 26–27.  
 62. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27.  
 63. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27. 
 64. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27. 
 65. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27. 
 66. Counsel referenced Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) and Alaska Packers 
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935), for the proposition that there was a 
“minimal due process requirement to decline to apply another state’s substantive law.” Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27. In Pac. Insurance, the Court held that California was not 
precluded from imposing greater responsibilities on an employer than a sister state would have done.  
 67. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).  
 68. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 30. 
AVIEL-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 3:58 PM 
736 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:721 
Justice Breyer then asked counsel to comment on the types of 
policies that a state might invoke in refusing to recognize a marriage from 
a sister state, and counsel appeared to posit the existence of some sort of 
restriction that would require the policy to qualify as “legitimate.”69 As 
he began to elaborate on his view that such a criterion would be satisfied 
by a policy that simply sought to “maintain a traditional man-woman 
definition of marriage,” Justice Scalia interjected, observing that “none 
of this has anything to do with Article IV, right? None of this has anything 
to do with Article IV? Full faith and credit, right?”70 Justice Scalia’s 
impatience can be read to convey a particular view of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, one that does not turn on substantive policy assessments.71 
Counsel’s response was somewhat vague, offering that “full faith and 
credit provides the background for the . . . states to be able to assert that, 
indeed, we have the right to decline to recognize the out of state 
marriage . . .” With the discussion foundering as to the role of interstate 
policy assessment in Full Faith and Credit applications, Justice Ginsburg 
reintroduced the distinction between judgments and choice of law, 
noting that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause there was no allowance 
to “reject a judgment from a sister State because you find it offensive to 
your policy,” but that “full faith and credit has never been interpreted to 
apply to choice of law.”72 Counsel readily agreed.73 
Any reprieve, however, was short-lived, as Justice Sotomayor 
challenged counsel to acknowledge the “fundamental difference between 
creating a marriage and recognizing a marriage.”74 Elaborating, she 
observed that states had typically not determined that any deviation from 
their own “prerequisites” for marriage constituted a violation of public 
policy.75 She asked counsel to justify the highly unusual nature of what 
the states had done in targeting same-sex marriage for special rules of 
non-recognition.76 Counsel replied, somewhat tautologically, that the 
kind of interstate variation in marriage policy that existed “before there 
was any idea of same-sex marriage” simply could not be compared to the 
phenomenon of same-sex marriage.77 He went on to posit that the place 
of celebration rule, with its “liberal” approach to marriage recognition, 
 69. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 30. 
 70. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 31. 
 71. For all the perils of making such a claim, it nonetheless brings to mind Justice Jackson’s view 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause: “Its interpretation is less involved than that of most constitutional 
provisions with social and political considerations. It is concerned with the techniques of the law. It 
serves to coordinate the administration of justice among the several independent legal systems which 
exist in our Federation.” 
 72. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 31—32. 
 73. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32. 
 74. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32. 
 75. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32.  
 76. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32. 
 77. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33. 
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evolved from a landscape in which “all States are on the same page about 
what marriage is . . . every State had the same definition.”78  While 
Justice Scalia seemed ready to reject this demonstrably untrue 
proposition,79 Justice Sotomayor shifted her focus to the type of legal 
construct that best captures the qualities of a marriage decree. She asked 
counsel whether he thought “marriage decrees are closer to laws than 
they are to judgments?”80 She noted that couples need a judgment to 
divorce, and suggested that this contributed to her assessment that a 
marriage decree is “much closer to a judgment than it [is] to a law.”81 
Counsel explained his contrary view that: 
the performing of a marriage is closer to law . . . because, in essence, when 
the marriage is performed, all the rights that flow from that State’s laws 
evolve to that couple. And it’s different than judgments and so does not 
deserve the same kind of treatment that judgments would, under the full 
faith and credit jurisprudence . . . .82 
After counsel labored to keep marriage out of the protected domain 
of judgments, Justice Sotomayor turned her attention to the other 
categories itemized in the Clause, and the textual question re-emerged: 
what does the Clause instruct with regards to Acts and Records?83 
Counsel, echoing the prevailing view discussed above, proffered that 
“marriages have always been treated as a conflict of law matter 
throughout all the years.”84 Chief Justice Roberts then sought some 
historical context, asking Counsel, “[o]utside of the present controversy, 
when was the last time Tennessee declined to recognize a marriage from 
out of state?” Counsel identified a 1970 marriage involving a stepfather 
and a stepdaughter.85 
Perhaps uncomfortable with the implications of this chronology, 
counsel hastened to explain that there was something “unprecedented” 
about States “changing the rules of the game” to include same-sex 
couples in the institution of marriage; that before this development, 
“States were all playing along with the same definition of marriage.”86 
Chief Justice Roberts quickly called the fallacy: “Well, but they weren’t 
playing along with the same definition. There have always been 
 78. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33. 
 79. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33 (“That’s just not”).  
 80. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33. 
 81. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33—34.  
 82. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 34.  
 83. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 34 (“How do you separate out the terms that 
Justice Scalia gave you?”).  
 84. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35. Counsel in fact opined that it was interstate 
marriage recognition that actually “gave rise to the entire conflict of law doctrine.” Id. at 35 (citing 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1834)). 
 85. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35. The reference seems to be to Rhodes  
v. McAffee, 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970). 
 86. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35. 
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distinctions based on age and family relationship. So they weren’t playing 
along under the same definition. And still, despite that, it apparently is 
quite rare for a State not to recognize an out-of-state marriage.”87 
In response, counsel persisted with the idea that there was 
something about gender qualifications that was categorically different 
than age or familial relationships.88 Counsel asserted, in essence, that 
nothing in the history of marriage conflicts could be considered 
precedential or illuminating for the challenge of same-sex marriage; that 
there was some implied limitation on the range of conflicts that the place 
of celebration rule, with its instinct for generosity, was equipped to 
handle.89 
Justice Alito, noting the posture of the case and the relationship 
between the two questions presented,90 observed that the Court would 
only reach the question of interstate recognition if it had first decided 
 87. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 36. 
 88.  
Refusal to recognize an out of state marriage “was and is quite rare, so long as we’re talking 
about what marriage is, so long as we’re talking about the fundamental man and woman 
marriage. And thatand that’s my point, is that as soon as States were confronted with the 
reality that some States were going to redefine marriage or expand the definition of 
marriage to include same­sex couples for the first time, then it’s unsurprising that they 
would determine, in keeping with their own laws, that they would not recognize those other 
States’ marriages inin Tennessee.  
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 36. 
 89. For a discussion of the intense emotional conflict over miscegenation, see Gregory Michael 
Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
119, 149 n.130 (1998) (referencing the Justices’ fear that addressing the anti-miscegenation statutes 
“would inflame the political environment in which they sought to implement Brown.”). Note that this 
history, focusing on the Justices’ refusal to consider Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), includes a 
brief reference to whether the case might be resolved on Full Faith and Credit grounds. Id. at 154. And 
although the other interstate recognition conflicts haven’t reached the same degree of national 
salience, the language from opinions rejecting out of state marriages as contrary to the state’s strong 
public policy reveals an intensity that doesn’t square with Counsel’s suggestion that the same-sex 
marriage controversy was the first real discrepancy between states over marriage policy. Take, for 
example, Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889), illuminating in part because it involves an 
archaic restriction on the remarriage of divorcees that has long since fallen out of useit takes a bit of 
effort even to recall this as an area of divergence between states. But the language very stridently 
expresses a strong public policy, negating the suggestion that this wasn’t an area of real difference 
between the states: The Tennessee Supreme Court found it to be:  
[D]ecided state policy not to permit the sensibilities of the innocent and injured husband 
or  wife, who has been driven by the adultery of his or her consort to the necessity of 
obtaining a divorce, to be wounded, nor the public decency to be affronted, by being forced 
to witness the continued cohabitation of the adulterous pair, even under the guise of a 
subsequent marriage performed in another state for the purpose of avoiding our statute, 
and believing that the moral sense of the community is shocked and outraged by such an 
exhibition, we will not allow such parties to shield themselves behind a general rule of the 
law of marriage, the wisdom and perpetuity of which depends as much upon the judicious 
exceptions thereto, as upon the inherent right of the rule itself.  
Id. at 308.  
 90. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 36. 
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that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require every state to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. When ruling on the interstate 
recognition issue, then, the Court would be operating against a backdrop 
in which it had already held that “a State has a sufficient reason for 
limiting marriage to opposite­sex couples.”91 Justice Alito made clear 
that for him, the import of this observation was the prospect of a middle 
ground: “So the question is whether there could be something in 
between . . .  a sufficient reason tofor the State to say, we’re not going 
to grant these licenses ourselves, but not a strong enough reason for us 
not to recognize a marriage performed out of state. I suppose that’s 
possible, isn’t it?”92 
Justice Alito’s phrasing suggested something a bit tentative, a sort 
of tenuous center that would not hold, and indeed, Counsel rejected the 
possibility of a federalist marriage compromise, insisting that “man-
woman marriage” was a necessary ingredient of any pro-recognition 
regime.93 Otherwise, he opined, couples could simply travel to a state that 
permits same-sex couples to get married, and then return to their home 
state demanding recognition. Justice Sotomayor pointed out that this 
phenomenon was hardly limited to same-sex couples, and that returning 
couples evading a variety of home state marriage restrictions have 
succeeded in having their marriages recognized under the place of 
celebration rule.94 The clear implication was that this dynamic thus failed 
to explain why divergence in state marriage policy regarding the gender 
composition of the couple was categorically different than other marriage 
conflicts in the nation’s history. Counsel reiterated what he viewed as the 
self-evident “fundamental distinction,” to which Justice Sotomayor 
pushed back: “The prerequisites are always a State’s judgment about 
marriage, about what should be a recognized marriage.” Counsel then 
attempted a variation on the theme, noting that “Tennessee, Ohio, 
Kentucky, and other States with a traditional definition of marriage have 
 91. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37. 
 92. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37. It is interesting to note that this is virtually 
a mirror image of the question he asked Petitioners’ counsel, the first question asked regarding 
Question 2. Justice Alito expressed surprise that the Petitioners’ briefing on Question 2 was “largely a 
repetition of the arguments” that Petitioners proffered on Question 1. Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 9, at 4–5. He then queried: “I thought the point of Question 2 was whether there would be 
a–an obligation to recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in another State where that is lawful 
even if the State itself, constitutionally, does not recognize same­sex marriage. I thought that’s the 
question in Question 2. Is–am I wrong?” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 5. 
 93. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 5. “Let me be clear. The–the justifications that 
have grown over time and the requirement for a strong public policy reason to decline to recognize a 
marriage have grown up around the man­woman definition. Our position is that so long as we’re talking 
about a marriage from another State that is not the man­woman definition, that it is simply the State’s 
interest in maintaining a cohesive and a coherent internal State policy with regard to marriage that 
justifies not recognizing those marriages.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37—38. 
 94. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 38. 
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done nothing here but stand pat.95 They have maintained the status quo. 
And yet other States have made the decision, and it certainly is their right 
and prerogative to do so, to expand the definition, to redefine the 
definition.” Counsel concluded emphatically that to require holdout 
states to “recognize those marriages imposes a substantial burden on 
their ability to  
self-govern.”96 
Justice Ginsburg noted that this was similar to the landscape 
surrounding divorce: “it is odd, isn’t it, that a divorce does become the 
decree for the nation? A divorce with proper jurisdiction in one State 
must be recognized by every other State, but not the act of marriage.”97 
Counsel acknowledged the point, but reiterated the “Court’s recognition 
of a distinction between judgments and laws,” asserting that only the 
latter was at issue with interstate marriage recognition. Having again 
characterized marriage licenses as laws, he proceeded to argue that 
requiring interstate recognition “would allow . . . a minority of States to 
legislate fundamental State concern about marriage for every other State 
quite literally . . . an enormous imposition and an intrusion upon the 
State’s ability to decide for itself important public policy.”98 And with 
some additional exchanges between counsel and the Justices regarding 
the ripple effects of marriage recognition on a state’s other domestic 
relations policies, the case was submitted.99 
C. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AGAIN RECEDES FROM VIEW 
Justice Kennedy, who had shown minimal interest in the interstate 
recognition question,100 wrote the historic opinion, blending concepts 
 95. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39. This is a disputable proposition, in the sense 
that many of the states that didn’t permit same-sex couples to marry did more than simply “stand pat” 
and eschew the profound policy changes taking place around them. They amended their constitutions 
and made specific, single issue exclusions to their choice of law rules. See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack, 
Same-Sex Marriage and Conflict of Law: The “Other” Constitutional Issue, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
477, 479 n.11 (2015). But putting these reservations aside, it is an assertion with interesting 
implicationsthat there is something less robust about interstate marriage recognition when it comes 
to policies that change the status quo. It isn’t clear, under the principles that have usually been thought 
to inform interstate recognition analysis, why would there be this preference against change.  
 96. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39. 
 97. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39. 
 98. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39. 
 99. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 41–47. 
 100. Justice Kennedy did not ask a single question of Respondents’ counsel during the argument 
on Question 2. He did ask one question of Petitioners’ counsel. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 9, at 9. He reiterated the point that Justice Alito led with, that the Court would only reach 
Question 2 if it had first determined that the state had a sufficient reason for excluding same-sex 
couples from their marriage regime, and asked Counsel to explain why that reasoning wouldn’t then 
carry over to the question of whether a state was required to recognize a valid same-sex marriage from 
another state. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 9. Counsel argued that a state would have 
to assert different, presumably stronger, reasons for undoing the marital status a couple had already 
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drawn from Equal Protection and Due Process to conclude that states 
were not permitted to exclude same-sex couples from the institution of 
marriage. As had been amply canvassed in the oral argument, this ruling 
effectively mooted the interstate recognition issue presented in Question 
Two.101 Each of the four dissenting justices wrote their own opinion 
objecting to various aspects of the majority’s Fourteenth Amendment 
ruling, but none of them endeavored to sketch out an alternative path 
illuminated by the guideposts of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.102 
When the Court announced its decision, the public reaction was intense, 
emotional, and overwhelmingly celebratory,103 although it was certainly 
decried and even resisted in some quarters.104 But no one, it might be 
surmised, was missing the interstate recognition discussion. 
So what, if anything, is there to glean from what we might call the 
phantom Full Faith and Credit Clause issues that emerged so 
resoundingly, only to disappear from the scene with no further ado? At 
the very least, it is fair to describe the Court’s questioning as an 
expression of skepticism towards the received wisdom that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause is irrelevant to interstate marriage recognition. This 
itself is significant, given the conviction with which conflicts scholars 
pronounced this very idea. On the contrary, especially in light of the 
posture of the case, which formally was focused exclusively on 
Fourteenth Amendment issues, the Justices seemed eager to pursue the 
intuition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is relevant to questions of 
marriage, that the Clause might have something to say about what 
appears to be, most of the time, the domain of state choice of law rules, 
and that there may be constitutionally significant principles of interstate 
recognition apart from whatever the Fourteenth Amendment requires. 
The observation that the text of the Clause encompasses more than 
just judgments, the notion that there might be something meaningful 
about the three distinct legal constructs itemized in the Clause, was taken 
seriously rather than treated as a rookie mistake. To the extent that the 
Full Faith and Credit doctrine has so far suggested a remarkable 
difference between the treatment of judgments and the choice of law 
problems that confront, say, a trial court deciding which state’s damages 
achieved in another state. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 9. 
 101. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 102. Id. at 2611—2631 (dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito).  
 103. See, e.g., Rachel Brody, Views You Can Use: Love Wins, U.S. NEWS (June 26, 2015, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2015/06/26/reactions-to-the-supreme-court-legaliz 
ing-gay-marriage. 
 104. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the Government Out of Marriage” Post Obergefell: 
The Ill-Considered Consequences of Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage, 2016 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1445 (2016); see also Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1029–32 
(2016) (describing both celebratory and condemnatory reactions on social media, including from 
political elites). 
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cap to apply to a personal injury suit, the discussion included some 
meaningful reflection on how best to categorize marriage licenses in such 
a binary scheme. While there were certainly further depths to explore, 
the Justices pushed counsel on the idea that a couple’s marital status, 
while neither the result of nor equivalent to a judgment, is also different 
in some fundamental ways from simple choice-of-law problems. At a 
minimum, the transcript vindicates the idea that the application of Full 
Faith and Credit principles to interstate marriage recognition is truly an 
open question, and not a frivolous one. It might, however, be an eternally 
ephemeral one, as once again it disappeared without yielding any 
answers. 
But why? Why is it never the right time to answer these questions, 
even during national controversies over marriage policy, when it might 
be most useful to know what obligations states owe to one another 
regarding marriages they would not have licensed?105 The answer may 
have something to do with what some commentators have observed is 
the Court’s tendency to follow rather than lead on divisive social issues. 
Contrary to the often-romanticized image of a Court at the vanguard of 
social change, the Court does not weigh in until public opinion has shifted 
in a decisive and discernable direction.106 Jumping in at the midpoint to 
 105. Consider the eleven years that passed between the Court’s refusal to hear Naim v. Naim, 350 
U.S. 891 (1955), concerning Virginia’s refusal to recognize an interracial marriage validly contracted 
in North Carolina, and the decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), invalidating Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation statutes. In Naim, the Court dodged its obligatory jurisdiction because it simply 
wasn’t ready to weigh in on the inflammatory question of inter-racial marriage, not even to address 
whether Virginia was required under Full Faith and Credit to recognize such marriages validly 
performed in other states. See Naim, 350 U.S. at 891. The Justices discussed this in conference, 
apparently, but decided not to pursue it. Eleven years later, by the time the Court got to Loving, it was 
ready to go all the way. The query is not why Loving was decided in the way that it was, as anything 
else is now inconceivable, but why the Full Faith and Credit question wasn’t taken up during the 
interval.  
 106. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 443 
(2005) (noting that “[t]he Justices in Brown did not think that they were creating a movement for 
racial reform; they understood that they were working with, not against, historical forces. By the time 
the Court struck down school segregation, polls revealed that a narrow majority of Americans 
approved of the decision.”); see also R. A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Anti-
miscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 856–57 (2008):  
The U.S. Supreme Court actively avoided addressing the constitutionality of bars on 
interracial marriagewidely regarded as the third rail of race relationsfor years, and then 
only did so after they had already decided comparatively less controversial issues, such as 
those concerning racial segregation in public schools, parks, restaurants, hotels, housing, 
transportation, and voting, among other things. By the time the Court decided Loving, 
nearly half of the states that had anti-miscegenation laws on their books when Andrea and 
Sylvester filed their lawsuit had repealed them. In many respects, some of the hardest work 
had already been done.  
John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J. 15, 16 (2007):  
But, at the time Loving was decided, anti-miscegenation laws were already on their way out. 
Only sixteen states still had such laws on the books, although all but twelve had once banned 
such marriages. Indeed, Maryland had voluntarily repealed its anti-miscegenation law just 
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provide a technocrat’s answer to an emotionally charged problem might 
be at odds with the practices of an institution responding in this way.107 
Nor was an incrementalist, comity-inspired solution necessarily the 
driving motive of those involved in the litigation.108 While a full portrait 
of the marriage equality movement is beyond the scope of this Article, a 
few basic observations are in order.109 Many of the parties who appeared 
before courts raising questions related to same-sex marriage were not 
lone litigants seeking merely an adjudication of their own marital 
statusthey were part of a coordinated strategy being developed and 
advanced by a national civil rights movement. While Full Faith and 
Credit Clause claims were raised where applicable,110 a constitutionalized 
set of interstate recognition obligations was not the primary goal that 
movement advocates were seeking. Its beneficiaries would, obviously, be 
a few months before the ruling in Loving was handed down, just as fourteen other states 
had done in the fifteen years prior. And, although the Supreme Court had never addressed 
the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans prior to Loving, two state courts had 
already struck down such laws on constitutional grounds. So while the Supreme Court’s 
ruling certainly hastened their demise, the criminalization of interracial marriage had 
already suffered a cultural blow that was more wounding than the constitutional one. 
 107. Josh Blackman & Howard M.Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 42 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 243, 322—23 (2016) (observing that the Justices were intent on “taking the cases when 
they thought the country was ready for nationwide same-sex marriage”).  
 108. Consider one revealing moment that arose during oral argument on Question 2, when Chief 
Justice Roberts seemed to have some difficulty envisioning how the Court could rule against 
Petitioners on Question 1 and then rule for Petitioners on Question 2. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 9, at 20–21. The concern was some perceived tension between the Court accepting a state’s 
reasons for not wanting to grant marriage licenses in the first instance, but then rejecting the state’s 
reasons for not wanting to recognize an existing marriage from another state. As others have argued 
in various forms, it is possible to answer these questions within the confines of Fourteenth 
Amendment principles, by invoking a couple’s liberty interest in retaining their existing marital status 
and emphasizing the truly unusual nature of the non-recognition measures taken by states such as 
Ohio and Tennessee. It seems quite analytically tenable to conclude that states don’t have to grant 
marriage in the first instance if they choose not to, but neither may they disregard the marital status 
conferred upon a couple by an equally sovereign sister state. And to the extent there is any real 
difficulty there, it is one that would be ameliorated by addressing the interstate recognition problem 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But instead Petitioners’ Counsel was somewhat reluctant to 
help the Chief Justice out of his difficulty, conceding that “II think that that actually highlights one 
of the problems of trying to decide thethe two cases differently, because, of course, deciding against 
Petitioners on Question 1, even if the Court decides in favor of Petitioners on Question 2, would forever 
relegate those marriages to second class status and would raise all kinds of questions whether those 
marriages could be subjected to laws that are not quite so favorable.” Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 9, at 21. Counsel took a bit of a gamble, sacrificing an opportunity to persuade one of the 
likely dissenters as to the interstate recognition issue.  
 109. For one particularly careful account, see Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering 
for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010); see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Marriage 
Demosprudence, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1679 (2016); Patricia A. Cain, Contextualizing Varnum  
v. Brien: A “Moment” in History, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27 (2009). 
 110. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 374 
F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (applying abstention and standing doctrines to avoid ruling on federal 
constitutional questions); Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514 (D.S.C. 2014); Jesty  
v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 1117069, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014). 
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the very specific subset of same-sex couples who had been able to marry 
in one jurisdiction, and then traveled to another. There was also no 
guarantee that even this middle ground would be easy to secure. In one 
of the earliest cases brought in such a posture, shortly after 
Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, the 
court rejected the Full Faith and Credit claims with a thinly reasoned 
explanation that provided little motivation to replicate the effort in other 
courts.111 
While there is much to learn from such accounts, I instead focus 
here on doctrinal explanations: specifically, a phenomenon I will call 
contingent doctrinal evolution. I clarify and elaborate on the core 
principles of choice of law doctrine and Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine, to show that the marriages that would most acutely raise Full 
Faith and Credit questions are increasingly being covered by these other 
doctrines. I also point out that the Full Faith and Credit questions 
presented by the issue of same-sex marriage were more complex than is 
first apparent, raising distinctive and truly novel questions of 
congressional power under Article IV.112 In the next Part I explore these 
issues. 
II.  CONTINGENT DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION 
To understand the perennial elision of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause in the interstate marriage context, we need to bring into the same 
frame the key doctrinal principles that characterize state choice of law 
methodology and constitutional marriage jurisprudence respectively. 
This is because the Full Faith and Credit question is practically 
important in the gap between the “place of celebration” rule (covering 
those interstate marriages that states will recognize “voluntarily” 
pursuant to their own choice of law methodology) and the area of 
marriage decisionmaking that is covered by the Fourteenth Amendment 
(consisting of those marriages that states must not only recognize but 
instantiate themselves).113 Marriages fall into the gap when states deem 
them contrary to public policy, and therefore ineligible for interstate 
 111. Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. The district court made no effort to distinguish marriage 
from other areas of state regulation, and in a conclusory assessment of two or three sentences 
determined that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. 
 112. Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 
1474 (2007) (noting that the Court has not provided much guidance on such issues: “Despite the 
mountain of federalism precedent accumulated in the over two hundred years since the Constitution’s 
adoption, the Court has scarcely addressed the question of Congress’s powers in the interstate 
context.”). Professor Metzger went on to posit that “the issue of whether DOMA’s § 2 exceeds 
Congress’s powers may well come before the Supreme Court in the near future.” Id. 
 113. Note how different this is from saying that interstate recognition questions are choice of law 
questions rather than Full Faith and Credit questions; or from the similar assertion that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause is satisfied whenever the place of celebration rule is applied.  
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recognition under the place of celebration rule, but the Supreme Court 
has not (yet) identified a universal state obligation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to grant such licenses in the first place. This gap is where it 
really matters whether states are obligated under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to recognize marriages from other states. As this section 
shows, that gap is shrinking as the Supreme Court’s animus 
jurisprudence continues to expand. 
Bringing choice of law principles into the same frame as the 
Fourteenth Amendment also gives us another insight into the Court’s 
doctrinal path selection: the unusual departures states took from their 
ordinary choice of law methodology revealed, perhaps as profoundly as 
anything else, the sort of animus that invalidates government 
decisionmaking. The specialized rules of non-recognition applied to 
same-sex marriages were so clearly marked by animus that the 
Fourteenth Amendment made sense as the most appropriate corrective 
instrument, even as to the interstate recognition questions that might 
have been addressed alternatively through the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. 
We then need to unearth the complicated structural and 
institutional questions that pervade this area, teasing out not only the 
way that states ought to relate to each other regarding such matters, but 
also Congress’ role in managing those relationships, and the role of 
federal courts in evaluating how Congress is performing as interstate 
relations manager. Congress, by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act, 
purported to weigh in on the interstate recognition of same-sex 
marriages, using authority assertedly granted to it under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. To rule on the interstate recognition obligations 
arising from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court would thus have 
had to determine not only what the Clause requires of its own force, but 
the permissible scope of congressional activity in this area. Against this 
backdrop, the eclipse of the Full Faith and Credit Clause becomes much 
easier to understandbut the picture is entirely different than the one 
advanced by the conflicts scholars. 
A. THE SHRINKING GAP BETWEEN THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION  
RULE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
As explained above, the ordinary conflicts law approach to interstate 
marriage recognition is quite expansive. The public policy exception was 
invoked to refuse recognition so rarely that some commentators were 
moved to question its existence.114 As Justice Jackson observed as early 
 114. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of 
-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (1996). As expressed by the courts: the public 
policy exception “has been applied rarely and only when the strongest of public policies is implicated.” 
Surnamer v. Ellstrom, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0504, 2012 WL 2864412, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 12, 2012) 
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as 1945, this very generosity “has forestalled pursuit of many questions 
as constitutional ones under the full faith and credit clause.”115 The 
importance of this dynamic in preventing exposition of the meaning and 
demands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, while perhaps somewhat 
obvious, can hardly be overstated.116 Where states are self-enforcing 
comity and stability values through a consistently generous application 
of the place of celebration rule, there is no need to determine what the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause would demand in the same scenario, and no 
viable avenue for such exploration. 
Crowding out the Full Faith and Credit Clause from the other 
direction is the expanding scope and force of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as applied to state marriage policy. Over the past sixty years, the Supreme 
Court has become increasingly skeptical of state authority to discriminate 
in the provision of marriage licenses, finding such discrimination to 
violate Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees. The landmarks in 
this area are well known and require little additional exposition here: 
through a series of cases including Loving, Zablocki, Turner, Windsor, 
and Obergefell, the Court has repeatedly treated marital decisionmaking 
as a fundamental right protected against discriminatory and burdensome 
government control.117 In requiring states to confer the benefits and 
status of marriage upon couples who do not conform to race and gender 
prerequisites, the Court’s marriage jurisprudence has blurred the 
otherwise  
“time-honored distinction” in American constitutional law between 
positive rights and negative liberties; while this may have “radical 
implications” for the future of substantive due process doctrine, it may 
simply reveal a certain “marriage exceptionalism” at work in this line of 
(citing Vandever v. Indus. Comm’n, 714 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)) (“The only marriages 
validly contracted in another jurisdiction that are denied recognition in Arizona are those involving 
the marriage of persons with a certain degree of consanguinity.”).  
 115. Jackson, supra note 19, at 17–18. Jackson wasn’t speaking exclusively of interstate marriage 
recognition, but of the broader tendency among state courts to be “hospitable to pleas that public acts 
or decisions of another state be taken into account.” Jackson, supra note 19, at 17–18. 
 116. It bears noting that Jackson viewed the Full Faith and Credit question in domestic relations 
cases as a thorny one: “The whole issue of faith and credit as applied to the law of domestic relations 
is difficult, and the books of the Court will not be closed on it for a long time, if ever.” Jackson, supra 
note 19, at 14. He observed that most of the time it comes up with regards to judgments; but that in 
many such cases it might just have plausibly emerged as a choice of law problem had the issues been 
raised earlier in the litigation. Jackson, supra note 19, at 14. 
 117. Obergefell v. Hodges, 570 U.S. 744 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 
147 (2015) (describing Obergefell as having “achieved canonical status even as Justice Kennedy read 
the result from the bench.”); see also Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage 
Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2016) (“From start to finish, the majority opinion in 
Obergefell reads like a love letter to marriage.”). 
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cases.118 The entrenchment of marriage’s special status in constitutional 
jurisprudence is perhaps best illustrated by the emergent scholarly 
literature describing Obergefell as a “conservative” decision119 and 
criticizing the prioritization of marriage above other forms of 
relationships.120 
Yet even as marriage has achieved a perhaps troubling pride of place 
in the constitutional order, the doctrinal developments that have pushed 
it to the top of the family form hierarchy have a broader reach. As the 
Court has been developing the fundamental right to marry, it has also 
been refining its approach to animus, clarifying that it is “an independent 
constitutional force” fatally tainting the results of majoritarian processes 
that target unpopular groups for special burdens and harms.121 The 
animus principle requires “a reasoned,  
public-regarding basis” for lawmaking, and will invalidate a “law that 
purposefully inflicts injury on its targets out of sheer disdain for them.”122 
This has truly powerful implications for the marriage controversies of the 
future. Individuals will be able to claim protection from animus-based 
state policy without needing to show that their relationships fit neatly 
into the facts and reasoning of Obergefell and its predecessors, which 
relied at least in part on the degree to which  
same-sex couples fit into the traditional template for state-sanctioned 
relationships.123 If the challenged policy can be shown to have the 
“purpose and effect to disparage and to injure,” the anti-animus principle 
will render it invalid.124 
One of the most powerful qualities of the anti-animus principle is 
that it does not require the same sort of “fit” with relevant precedent that 
fundamental rights jurisprudence is thought to demand.125 As scholars 
have noted, normative and predictive questions remain about the reach 
 118. Yoshino, supra note 117, at 168; see also Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 1691 (2016). 
 119. See Leonore Carpenter & David S. Cohen, A Union Unlike Any Other: Obergefell and the 
Doctrine of Marital Superiority, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 124, 124 (2015–2016); see also Clare 
Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015). 
 120. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 117, at 1207–08; Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the 
Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015).  
 121. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 
188 (2013) (positing that “Windsor refined and enlarged the concept of unconstitutional animus”).  
 122. Id. at 223.  
 123. As has been noted elsewhere, both Windsor and Obergefell emphasized the extent to which 
same-sex couples “shared values and interests . . . with more traditional families.” Id. at 220; see also 
Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 925 (2016) 
(describing Obergefell as a “triumph of the assimilationist approach” in its “rhetoric about the 
universality of marriage and its stories of the named plaintiffs’ shared lives, in sickness and in health 
and through the difficulties of chosen commitments, from parenting to military service.” ). 
 124. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).  
 125. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
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of the anti-animus principle.126 Nonetheless, the descriptive case for an 
emerging “Windsor Products” jurisprudence, so named to emphasize the 
connection to anti-animus concerns expressed as far back as United 
States v. Carolene Products,127 is persuasive, and helps explain the 
atrophying of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as applied to interstate 
marriage recognition. There may not be much daylight between the sort 
of sentiment that has qualified as “strong public policy” for choice of law 
purposes and the kind that is now prohibited by Fourteenth Amendment 
anti-animus principles. 
If we look back at the few cases in which out of state marriages were 
denied recognition on the grounds of “strong public policy,” we see how 
substantially that expression is infused with the type of conclusory, 
disparaging sentiment we are now likely to deem invalid, or at least 
inadequate to survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.128 This is 
manifestly clear with the interracial marriage cases, where the policy 
being advanced was the promotion of white supremacy; it requires little 
additional exposition to demonstrate the conclusive application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s central and most important anti-animus 
principle.129 But even as to the prohibitions on subsequent remarriage 
that succumbed to obsolescence, or the incest and polygamy restrictions 
that have not (yet) been invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
we see little more in the way of public policy discussion than expressions 
of visceral disgust with certain types of relationships.130 Indeed, perhaps 
one of the more revealing passages in this set of cases is one in which the 
judge seeks to justify the refusal to recognize an interracial marriage by 
 126. See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 205 (2013) (noting three questions that remained unanswered after 
Windsor, including the definition of animus; what would be accepted as evidence of animus; and what 
the relationship would be between animus and rational basis review); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, 
Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2073 
(2015) (challenging the view that “animus is the critical factor that triggers rational basis with bite.”).  
 127. See Carpenter, supra note 121, at 183–84 (observing that the roots of anti-animus doctrine 
grounding the holding in United States v. Windsor reach back more than seventy years to the concerns 
articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938), about 
prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities”). 
 128. See, e.g., Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 307 (Tenn. 1889) (considering an out of state 
marriage between a divorced woman and her partner in the adulterous affair that ended the marriage, 
and expressing “the very pronounced convictions of the people of this State as to the demoralization 
and debauchery involved in such alliances”). 
 129. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (Ala. 1881) (prohibition of interracial marriage 
grounded on “sound public policy” of preventing “the amalgamation of the two races, producing a 
mongrel population and a degraded civilization”); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (state’s 
interest in prohibiting miscegenation is ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ prevent 
‘corruption of the blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and the ‘obliteration of racial pride’).  
 130. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (2010). Nussbaum uses the term “Devlinesque,” after Lord Patrick Devlin, to 
characterize arguments that “widespread disgust at a practice is sufficient reason to forbid that 
practice through law.” Id. at 8, 82. 
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invoking a laundry list of other offensive relationships to which the 
purported recognition obligation might then apply. Allow interracial 
marriages to go unpunished131 on the grounds that the marriage was valid 
where celebrated, the judge argued, and:  
we might have in Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son 
with the mother, the brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because 
they had formed the relations in a State or country where they were not 
prohibited. The Turk or Mohammedan, with his numerous wives, may 
establish his harem at the doors of the capitol, and we are without remedy. 
Yet none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided, or more 
unnatural than the case before us.132 
 This lumping together of stigmatized, outcast marriages, without 
even the slightest effort to explain the particularized harm the state is 
seeking to prevent with each respective prohibition, falls short of what 
we now expect states to be able to muster when defending a challenged 
marriage policy. 
To survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge under any standard 
of review, states need to articulate public policy goals more concretely 
and ascertainably grounded on “a reasoned, public-regarding basis” than 
the appeals to disgust that permeate the applications of the public policy 
exception.133 While states might be able to improve on the efforts to 
articulate specific legitimate goals with the benefit of sixty years of equal 
protection jurisprudence,134 the language in the older cases reminds us 
of the sense of revulsion, the idea that some types of relationships are just 
self-evidently “revolting,” that underlies a great deal of marriage 
controversy. Not only do such sentiments no longer stand alone as 
adequate grounds to justify state marriage policy, they more likely do the 
oppositeperhaps not quite as a “silver bullet,”135 but as reminders that 
courts must search for meaningful ways that a challenged policy actually 
advances public welfare. 
I do not mean to gloss over the difficult conceptual and predictive 
questions that remain open in this area, including the challenge of 
distinguishing impermissible animus, typically directed against discrete 
and insular minorities,136 from the legitimate proscription of harmful 
 131. Sometimes, states converted their choice of law rule into a criminal prohibition. See, e.g., 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 132. State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (Tenn. 1872). 
 133. Carpenter, supra note 121, at 224.  
 134. As we’ll see in the next Subpart, infra Part II.B. 
 135. Cf. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 889,  
930 (2012).  
 136. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Tobias Wolff’s 
work, arguing that prohibitions against same-sex marriage exclude gays and lesbians from marriage 
much more categorically than other types of restrictions. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis 
in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2248–49 (2005). 
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conduct.137 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s protests to the contrary, 
animus doctrine in its current form leaves open the possibility of 
permissible animusand perhaps state laws prohibiting marriages 
between close relatives, as one example, would fall into exactly this 
domain.138 
The point is simply that at the juncture where states refuse to apply 
the place of celebration rule, citing “strong public policy,” we might very 
well see the sort of animus that draws in the equal protection guarantee, 
even if it is better disguised than in past cases applying the public policy 
exception. When we look specifically at the extraordinary lengths to 
which states went in refusing recognition to out-of-state same-sex 
marriages, we can make an even stronger point. As explained in the next 
section, the reactionary suspension of the states’ own choice of law 
principles for one class of disfavored marriages falls so squarely in the 
animus heartland as to all but demand assessment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
B. THE ANIMUS OF TOTAL NON-RECOGNITION 
To understand how profoundly the nonrecognition of same-sex 
marriages was motivated by animus, we must return to the pronounced 
generosity of the place of celebration rule as it was applied before the 
same-sex marriage controversy. It bears repeating that in the face of 
forum law disallowing the marriage in question, “the overwhelming 
tendency” nonetheless had been “to validate the marriage.”139 This 
longstanding tradition of recognition threw into stark relief the 
unprecedented manner in which states targeted same-sex couples for 
specialized rules of non-recognition. As lucidly summarized in an amicus 
brief filed by family law and conflicts scholars: 
The statutory and constitutional bans on recognition of marriages by same-
sex couples are historically unprecedented in that they create overlapping 
and categorical rules rather than allowing for individualized, fact-based 
determinations; they shift decision-making power from courts, where it 
had largely resided, to the legislature; they draw no distinction between 
marriages contracted in a particular state to evade restrictions of the 
couple’s home state (“evasive marriages”) and those contracted by 
residents of another state; and, finally, they enshrine the rule of non-
recognition in the state’s constitution.140 
 137. For some thoughts on the difference, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 130, at 57–59, discussing 
ways in which sexual behavior might affect the interests of others, and differentiating between coercive 
harm, public nuisance type concerns, and merely “constructive disgust”; see also Yoshino, supra note 
117, at 167–68 (noting the trouble with a distinction between status and conduct). 
 138. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (J. Scalia, dissenting) (protesting “that one could 
consider certain conduct reprehensiblemurder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to 
animalsand could exhibit even “animus” toward such conduct.”).  
 139. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 44, at 397.  
 140. See Brief for Family Law and Conflict of Laws Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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The consequences of this categorical approach, absolutely barring 
recognition of any claims arising out of a same-sex relationship, included 
scenarios that were downright irrational: courts repeatedly refusing, for 
example, to consider divorce petitions filed by same-sex couples because 
doing so would “give effect” to the disfavored relationship.141 As Professor 
Koppelman observes, “it is odd for a state to oppose same-sex marriages 
by making it virtually impossible to end them.”142 
What is the most appropriate doctrine with which to evaluate the 
extraordinary measures that states took to deny recognition to couples 
with valid marriage licenses from other states? On the one hand, it 
requires a thorough grounding in state law conflicts precedent, with its 
overwhelmingly pro-recognition bent, to appreciate how extraordinary 
these measures were. It thus made sense that that during the argument 
in Obergefell, we saw discussion of these phenomena in conjunction with 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, given the closely intertwined 
relationship between the Clause and state choice of law principles. 
However, while the unusual hostility directed at one class of disfavored 
marriages was threaded through the interstate recognition discussion, it 
was difficult to know what relevance it would have for a Full Faith and 
Credit analysis. This was in part because marriage recognition under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause is uncharted territory, but also because of a 
sense that whatever analytical framework that would emerge might not 
have a place for the animus concept.  
Conversely, we know quite well, with more insight all the time, how 
consequential it is under the Fourteenth Amendment when an unpopular 
group is targeted for unequal burdens.143 As Professor Koppelman has 
observed, the stridency and totality of the  
non-recognition policies directed at same-sex couples exceeded even 
what the Southern courts of the Jim Crow era had applied to interracial 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, De Leon v. Perry, 2014 WL 4796335 *3 (No. 14-50196); see also Brief for Conflict 
of Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners and Reversal, Obergefell  
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (listing examples from Louisiana and Virginia), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV5/1
4-556_amicus_pet_conflict.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 141. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 666–67 (Tex. App. 2010) 
(dismissing a divorce petition on grounds that adjudication on the merits would give effect to a claim 
arising from a same-sex marriage, thus violating Texas public policy, expressed in state constitution, 
against same-sex marriage); see also Ellen Shapiro, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: The Difficulties of 
Obtaining A Same-Sex Divorce, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 208, 210 (2013) (noting that courts in 
Nebraska, Indiana, Texas, and Pennsylvania had denied same-sex divorces to couples legally married 
in other states); Tracy A. Thomas, Same-Sex Divorce, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 218, 219 (2014) (noting 
that Georgia expressly bans same-sex divorce for out-of-state marriages); Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No 
Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73 (2011).  
 142. Koppelman, supra note 21, at 105. 
 143. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (expressing disfavor for “discriminations of 
an unusual character”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (same).  
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marriages.144 The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, does and probably 
should exert a sort of gravitational pull on these questions. In light of the 
hostility brought into stark relief by the interstate recognition issue, there 
might be something tepid, sterile or unconvincing about a superficially 
“neutral”145 marriage federalism grounded primarily in the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and policed by strong categorical rules of interstate 
recognition.146 
Even if the Court were inclined to impose constitutional recognition 
requirements as a middle of the road approach to resolving national 
marriage controversies, it could do so via Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection and due process principles, an avenue with expressive 
qualities that are missing from the Full Faith and Credit domain. To 
illustrate, consider the lower court decision that eventually provided the 
caption for the consolidated appeals in Obergefell.147 Ohio residents 
James Obergefell and John Arthur had traveled to Maryland and were 
validly married there, so the only issue in Obergefell’s challenge to Ohio’s 
marriage scheme was interstate recognition.148 The same was true for co-
plaintiff David Michener, who had married in Delaware and sought to 
have Ohio issue a death certificate for his late spouse that accurately 
reflected their marital status.149 The district court’s determination that 
Ohio was constitutionally obligated to honor these out of state marriages 
was based entirely on Fourteenth Amendment principles. The district 
court first determined that the right to remain married was a 
 144. Koppelman, supra note 21, at xiv.  
 145. I put this in scare quotes to demonstrate my understanding that there was no neutral vantage 
point here. To rule against the Petitioners would have been to affirmatively and deliberately embrace 
a meager, and in my view impoverished, view of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it is possible, at least 
in the abstract, to imagine a strictly pro-recognition marriage federalism that is neutral, or at least 
silent, as to the policy questions surrounding a state’s marriage regime. When we shift our focus to the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, we are reminded that it requires states to accept the judgments of sister 
state courts without any independent assessment of underlying substantive policy questions. It is 
precisely this doctrinal feature that distinguishes it so consequentially from the place of celebration 
rule. A moment during the argument gestures at this; after an extended discussion about what type of 
policy objections a state should be required to invoke before refusing to recognize an out of state 
marriage, Justice Scalia interjected with “[n]one of this has anything to do with Article IV, right? None 
of this has anything to do with Article IV? Full faith and credit, right?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 
31, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). The comment simultaneously revealed 
an impatience with the seemingly irresolvable policy questions and a bit of optimism that an analytical 
framework grounded in Article IV might offer an escape hatch. The moment was particularly revealing 
in light of the fact the Full Faith and Credit Clause, strictly speaking, hadn’t really been teed up for the 
Court’s assessment.  
 146. Reacting to Windsor, scholars characterized the federalist approach as a “way station” on 
route to greater articulation of rights. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor 
as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 87 (2014).  
 147. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013).  
 148. Id. at 976. 
 149. Id.  
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fundamental right under Due Process,150 and then observed that against 
a long-standing practice of applying the place of celebration rule to out 
of state marriages, Ohio’s decision to single out same-sex marriages for 
non-recognition violated the Equal Protection clause.151 The district court 
emphasized that Ohio had “historically and unambiguously provided 
that the validity of a marriage is determined by whether it complies with 
the law of the jurisdiction where it was celebrated.”152  
Ohio had thus recognized a number of out-of-state marriages that 
could not have been lawfully solemnized within Ohio, including 
marriages between first cousins and marriages involving minors.153 The 
district court’s opinion left no room for doubt that the strength and 
longevity of Ohio’s pro-recognition tradition underscored the 
impermissible animus at work in its singular treatment of same-sex 
marriages.154 As animus evolves into a more robust, more mature, and 
more developed doctrine,155 it may leave little room for a policy-free 
marriage federalism helmed by the demands of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. 
C. CONGRESS AS AN ADDED COMPLICATION 
Resolving the controversy over same-sex marriage entirely through 
Fourteenth Amendment principles also allowed the Court to avoid 
difficult questions about the appropriate role for Congress in 
administering an interstate recognition regime. While the first provision 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks directly to the states, requiring 
each to give due effect to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
of other states, the second provision, often called the “Effects” clause, 
gives Congress the authority to “prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”156 
 150. Id. at 978.  
 151. Id. at 983–96.  
 152. Id. at 983.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1040 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d by DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (four same-sex 
couples sought to compel Ohio to recognize their out-of-state marriages; district court emphasized the 
consistency with which Ohio had applied the place of celebration rule to heterosexual marriages, even 
as to marriages entered into with the intent to evade Ohio marriage law.). The court noted that “prior 
to 2004, the Ohio legislature had never passed a law denying recognition to a specific type of marriage 
solemnized outside of the state.” Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1040. Full Faith and Credit was mentioned 
only in passing, and only with regards to the recognition of an out of state adoption decree. Id. at 1058; 
see also Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1027 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (same-sex couple married in 
Massachusetts challenging Indiana’s refusal to recognize their marriage; court noted that “as a general 
rule,” Indiana recognizes valid marriages performed out of state even when those could not have been 
solemnized in Indiana). 
 155. But see Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 151 (2016) (locating 
Obergefell and Windsor in a phenomenon of LGBT exceptionalism).  
 156. U.S. CONST., art. IV § 1.  
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Congress purported to be doing exactly that in the second section of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act, which endeavored to release the states 
from any obligation to recognize a same-sex marriage or any claim 
arising from one: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same-sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim 
arising from such relationship.157 
Against this statutory backdrop, any conclusion that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause requires interstate marriage recognition would have 
required engagement with the Effects Clause, determining not only 
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of its own accord requires states 
to honor sister state marriage licenses, but also whether the Effects 
Clause allows Congress to suspend or supersede obligations that states 
would have in the absence of congressional action.158 Resolving a Full 
Faith and Credit challenge to a state’s refusal to recognize an out of state 
marriage would thus have required two distinct analytical steps, neither 
of them straightforward. Even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires 
interstate marriage recognition when operating directly on the states, 
does Congress have the power under the Effects clause to ordain a 
different result?159 As to the first part of the inquiry, the analysis would 
require resolution of the questions that emerged during the Obergefell 
 157. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006)). 
 158. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 14, at 1496 (“It may be that, nonetheless, giving fair weight to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes Congress from entirely legislating away interstate comity, 
but congressional relaxation of the credit due particular classes of laws and judgments does not rise to 
that extreme.”); see also Michael DiSiena, Note, Eluding the Grim Reaper: How Section 2 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act Could Survive Strict Scrutiny, 19 WASH. & LEE J. C. R. & SOC. JUST. 151, 154 
(2012) (“According to the reasoning of DOMA’s drafters, the Effects Clause enables Congress to 
contract the extent of the faith and credit requirements imposed on the states by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, even to the point of eliminating them altogether.”). 
 159. One commentator suggests that this would have been true even after Windsor, in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated § 3 of DOMA defining marriage for all federal purposes as composed of 
one man and one woman, because the Court didn’t consider § 2, the provision assertedly enacted 
pursuant to Congress’s Article IV power. William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage After Windsor, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 150 (2013); see also Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 
514, 527 (D.S.C. 2014), appeal dismissed (July 20, 2015) (recognizing that section 2 was not at issue 
in Windsor, and therefore “appears to still be an appropriate exercise of Congressional power to 
regulate conflicts between the laws of two different States.”). Although it is of course indisputable that 
Windsor left intact whatever power Congress thought itself to enjoy under the effects clause, only in 
an abstract or provisional way can we say that § 2 continued in full force after Windsor. Congress 
cannot, of course, violate Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees even when legislating pursuant 
to one of its enumerated powers, and § 2 very likely reflects the same impermissible animus that 
invalidated § 3. Scholars made this argument well before Windsor. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, 
Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24, 32 
(1997).  
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oral argument: does the Full Faith and Credit Clause impose upon states 
an inflexible obligation to honor the marriage licenses of sister states, 
even when the marriage rests on statutory provisions deemed offensive 
by the forum state? Is there a public policy exception to the demands of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause that echoes the exception to the place of 
celebration rule?160 Are marriage licenses more like judgments, falling 
within the settled core of the Clause’s mandate, or like laws, where the 
Court has given up trying to establish constitutional parameters for the 
application of one state’s laws versus another’s?161 
The second step of the inquiry is to determine whether Congress 
may set aside what would otherwise be the self-executing demands of 
Full Faith and Credit. We know that Congress does not have this power 
with regards to Equal Protection, of course,162 but some scholars of 
interstate relations, such as Professor Metzger, view the obligations of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as constitutional default rules that 
Congress may choose to override, “rather than constituting the 
unalterable demands of union.”163 In this view, “[w]hile these provisions 
are judicially enforceable against the states, their enforceability is 
contingent on the absence of congressional authorization of interstate 
discrimination.”164 Against this scholarly backdrop, it is particularly 
interesting that Section Two of DOMA was never once mentioned during 
the interstate recognition discussion in Obergefell. The Justices seemed 
to assume that the judiciary, rather than Congress, would be the 
authoritative arbiter of interstate disputes. But again, given the posture 
of the interstate recognition issue and its ultimate resolution on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, there is only so much we can 
infermaybe the Justices assumed that section 2 would be rendered 
invalid by the same animus that had felled section 3 in United States  
v. Windsor,165 rather than assuming that an otherwise valid 
 160. Note that one of the married couples in Obergefell who were seeking sister state recognition 
had migratory rather than evasive marriages, as they were domiciled in the jurisdictions where they 
married. The discussion didn’t reflect this distinction, even though it is a material one in place of 
celebration jurisprudence. Under these circumstances, and especially considering that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause wasn’t even formally presented, it would probably be a stretch to infer any sort of 
consensus that the difference between migratory and evasive marriages is or is not relevant for Full 
Faith and Credit purposes.  
 161. Laycock, supra note 11, at 290. 
 162. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (“Congress does not have the power 
to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).  
 163. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1469; see also Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the 
Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2210 (2005) (asserting that “no federal 
constitutional full faith and credit challenge is availing” with regards to state anti-recognition laws 
because of the federal DOMA).  
 164. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1475. 
 165. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the provision of the Defense of 
Marriage Act defining marriage for all federal purposes as consisting of one man and one woman, 
without considering the provision purporting to allow states to refuse recognition to same-sex 
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congressional enactment under the Effects Clause was irrelevant to the 
interstate recognition issue. In any event, if Professor Metzger is right, 
then the Full Faith and Credit Clause is limited in operative effect not 
only to the narrow category of marriages that fall between the place of 
celebration rule and impermissible animus, as previously described, but 
in the further circumscribed area where Congress has not acted.166 
Professor Metzger draws on a rich array of sources in support of the 
thesis. As a textual matter, she notes that “[a]t the same time as it 
prohibits state discrimination in absolute terms, Article IV also grants 
Congress broad control over aspects of interstate relations without 
expressly subjecting Congress itself to equivalent antidiscrimination 
requirements.”167 She notes that “nothing in the phrase ‘the effect 
thereof” precludes Congress from determining that certain state laws and 
judgments should receive more or less credit than they would absent 
such congressional action. Indeed, on its face this language would allow 
Congress to prescribe that some laws and judgments should be given no 
effect; after all, it is perfectly compatible with standard usage to reply 
‘none’ or ‘no effect’ when asked to specify the effect something should 
have.”168 Nor do we have guidance from the Court as to these interpretive 
questions. As Metzger notes, “little precedent exists on the scope of 
Congress’s power under that clause, particularly regarding congressional 
power to contract the credit otherwise due state laws and judgments.”169 
Turning to normative and functional arguments in support of 
congressional authority over interstate relations, Professor Metzger 
asserts that allowing Congress to legislate in this role can result in 
“positive good.”170 In discussing the idea that “a variety of legitimate 
national considerations might lead Congress to allow a state to favor its 
own, such as allowing states to protect themselves from “harmful 
externalities of other states’ actions,”171 Professor Metzger offers DOMA 
as an example, bringing us to the very heart of interstate marriage 
conflicts.”172 By referencing the “harmful externalities” imposed on a 
state by another state’s decision to recognize a certain type of marriage, 
the argument raises, but does not answer, a crucial question: which states 
need protection? Do the non-recognition states need protection from the 
marriages from other states). See supra note 157.  
 166. Although we might surmise that where an issue of interstate marriage recognition has become 
so salient as to prompt Congress to act, there likely is to be the sort of animus at work that we saw 
underlying DOMA and that invalidates government action under the 14th Amendment.  
 167. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1475–76.  
 168. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1495. 
 169. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1493. 
 170. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501. 
 171. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501. 
 172. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 6–10 (1996), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2910–14 (stating one purpose of DOMA is to protect states from the effects 
of Hawaii’s recognition of same-sex marriage)). 
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marriage-expansive states? Or do the marriage-expansive states need 
protection from the holdouts? Any regime striving for a coherent 
approach to interstate marriage recognition must be grounded upon an 
answer to this question, and yet a fully satisfactory answer is missing 
from the existing literature, which has not been sufficiently attentive to 
the concrete reasons states concern themselves with the institution of 
marriage. Appeals to state sovereignty will not get us far, because at best 
we have the makings of a zero sum gamemarital status is, of course, 
binary, and where two states disagree about whether a particular couple 
is married or not, one of the states is deprived of their regulatory 
prerogative.173 Whether it is Congress or the Court that picks the winner, 
we ought to be satisfied that the winner is the state with the strongest 
claim to regulatory authority over the marriages in question. In the next 
Part, I explore what this analysis would look like. 
D. THE CENTRAL QUESTION FOR MARRIAGE FEDERALISM 
The relief from recognition obligations purportedly conferred by 
DOMA is a “legitimate national consideration”174 for Article IV purposes 
only if we can agree that it offers protection where protection is needed 
in a federal union. This, however, is far from clear. As Professor Gerken 
and Ari Holtzblatt describe, “[t]he conventional worry in horizontal 
federalism, with its focus on territoriality and sovereignty, is that states 
that favor marriage equality will impose that preference on states that 
don’t. But it might be just as important to a state to have the same-sex 
marriages it has blessed recognized outside of its territory.”175  
This crucial insightthat state sovereignty interests run in both 
directionsis an important rejoinder to the recurring concern that 
mandatory interstate recognition allows one state to set policy for the 
entire nation.176 But it also paves the way for an even more foundational 
 173. As Laycock argues so persuasively, when it comes to interstate disputes, “[s]tate law cannot 
supply the answers, because the questions are about interstate relations and no state is empowered to 
answer for any other.” Laycock, supra note 11, at 259; see also Jackson, supra note 19, at 30, explaining 
the fundamental difference between state choice of law rules and constitutionalized obligations:  
[Choice of law rules] extend recognition to foreign statutes or judgments by rules developed 
by a free forum as a matter of enlightened self-interest. The constitutional provision 
extends recognition on the basis of the interests of the federal union, which supersedes 
freedom of individual state action by a compulsory policy of reciprocal rights to demand 
and obligations to render faith and credit. States under their voluntary policy may extend 
recognition when they could not constitutionally be required to do so; and sometimes, of 
course, they have interpreted the law of conflicts to refuse credit when the constitutional 
mandate is held to require it. 
 174. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501.  
 175. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism,  
113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 78 (2014).  
 176. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 15 (“We live in a very mobile society, 
and people move all the time . . . one state would basically set the policy for the entire nation.”);  
see also Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005).  
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point: resolving interstate marriage conflicts in a way that is consistent 
with federalism values177 requires a much more searching inquiry into the 
respective state interests in recognition and non-recognition than has 
previously been fully appreciated.178 We ought not to simply assume 
some sort of neutralizing symmetry between the interests of the holdout 
states and the marriage expansive states, between one state’s interest in 
having its marriage determinations recognized by other states and 
another state’s interest in refusal.179 The interests are not only unevenly 
weighted but not even commensurate in the first place. Furthermore, 
such interests are not even articulable without specifying the recurrently 
important question of the state to which the couple is most significantly 
connected, as that is the starting point for determining which state has 
the strongest regulatory claim.180 The only way forward in a faithful 
union is twofold: first, to hone in on which state has the most persuasive 
claim to regulate the marital status of the couple in question, and second, 
to accept that this state’s regulatory authority must travel with the couple 
in any regime that claims fidelity to the core principles of both federalism 
and marriage. 
How do we determine which state has the most persuasive claim to 
regulate a particular couple’s marital status? What is easy to see is a 
state’s interest in the marital status of its own domiciliaries. Both the case 
law and the literature are replete with elaborations on the practical 
reasons that a couple’s marital status is an appropriate concern for the 
state in which they live, including property rights, financial obligations, 
and stability in caretaking arrangements for children.181 This is why the 
 177. For the view that federalism is best thought of as a means to an end rather than an end in 
itself, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 175, at 68 n.22.  
 178. And when we do this, we will further see how completely and categorically different these 
interests are than the ones that get weighed in workers’ compensation, tort liability, and other kinds 
of interjurisdictional disputes.  
 179. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2215 (2005) (discussing a state’s interest in expressing moral condemnation of disfavored 
relationships).  
 180. Id. at 2237 (asserting that “states have a legitimate interest in preventing their domiciliaries 
from entering into evasive out-of-state marriages for the purpose of circumventing a prohibition 
contained in local law. . . . [M]any courts concluded that evasive marriages directly undermine the 
laws of the domiciliary forum and encourage other states to show disrespect for forum policies, to the 
detriment of interstate relations.”).  
 181. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942): 
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of 
persons domiciled within its borders. The marriage relation creates problems of large social 
importance. Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital 
responsibilities are but a few of commanding problems in the field of domestic relations 
with which the state must deal. Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command 
over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its 
own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there . . . 
But see Singer, supra note 2, at 27 (explaining that a place of celebration rule gives much more 
predictability in a multistate system than a domicile rule). 
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conflicts scholars have been right to focus on issues of domicile when 
attempting to determine sensible choice of law rules for interstate 
marriage recognition.182 But where they have fallen short is in explaining 
how these concrete interests translate into constitutional questions.183 As 
Professor Laycock urges, the Full Faith and Credit Clause “assumes the 
existence of some basis for recognizing which state’s law applies,” and 
then requires that each state act in accordance.184 For marriage disputes, 
domicile is a centrally important basis for recognizing which state’s law 
applies.”185 
If there is consensus about a domicile’s interest in the marital status 
of its domiciliaries, the problems arise when a couple’s domicile changes, 
because there is then a contest between domiciles. Professor Strasser has 
argued persuasively that in a contest over marriage policy between a 
couple’s current domicile and their future domiciles, the domicile at the 
time the couple was married should prevail.186 His arguments emphasize 
the gravity of the personal interests at stake for the couple upon 
migration; he does not address whether the first domicile itself has 
interests that support the continuance of its regulatory authority over the 
couple in question.187 The argument therefore relies largely on 
Fourteenth Amendment principles but does not solve the perpetually 
elusive federalism puzzle taken on here: whether there is a legitimate 
national consideration justifying Congress’s decision to relieve states of 
their recognition obligations. To answer that question, we need to push 
harder on the set of interests that states have in regulating marriage, 
being careful to distinguish between a couple’s interest in the formal 
recognition of their relationship and a state’s interest in offering such 
 182. Silberman, supra note 163.  
 183. For one important exception, see Gene Shreve, whose original and thought-provoking 
argument is that the interests driving conflicts analysis are too readily identifiable as appropriate 
constitutional concernstake one step and the entire field would need to be constitutionalized. Gene 
R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 272 (1996) (“Constitutional 
justifications for Supreme Court intervention so fully partake of the mainstream values of choice of 
law that, should the Court begin to give serious weight to the former, it would find no logical stopping 
point short of constitutionalizing the entire subject.”). 
 184. Laycock, supra note 11, at 301. Even Ex Parte Kinney, rejecting all constitutional challenges 
to a conviction for violating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation prohibition, observed that the case would 
have a different tenor if the petitioners had been DC residents when they married, who then moved to 
Virginia expecting to retain their marital status. Laycock, supra note 11, at 606. This question of the 
jurisdiction with the most significant connection to the couple is revealing, because while we are 
accustomed to seeing it in cases applying the place of celebration rule, this judge finds it significant for 
federal constitutional purposes. Although he mentions it in analyzing the privileges and immunities 
claim, perhaps it is a key to unlock the dilemma of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s application to 
marriage licenses. 
 185. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 606 (1947) (“[M]arriage 
looks to domicile.”).  
 186. Strasser, supra note 30, at 12 (“[T]he domicile is understood to have a great interest in the 
marital status of its domiciliaries.”). 
 187. And not coincidentally, he thus doesn’t pursue Full Faith and Credit questions. 
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recognition. The suite of benefits accorded to married couples has been 
repeatedly inventoried188 and characterized as “vast,”189 and a great deal 
of attention has been lavished on the interest that couples have in 
accessing this suite of benefits on equal and nondiscriminatory terms.190 
Our purpose here is to hone in on why states bother to create and 
administer these regimes in the first place, and then to assess whether 
these state interests travel with a couple outside of the state’s territorial 
boundaries.191 
Paeans to marriage have long been plentiful in our legal culture, but 
much of the language is too lofty and idealized to illuminate the real 
interests at work.192 To weigh the competing state sovereignty claims we 
have to dig a bit deeper to determine what concrete state purposes the 
institution serves. An idea developed in one influential account is the 
essential place to start: marriage, as the central organizing institution of 
family law, is a distributive mechanism for “social goods of an immense 
variety of kinds: material resources like money, jobs, nutrition; symbolic 
resources like prestige and degradation; psychic resources like 
affectional ties, erotic attraction and repulsion . . .”193 By marrying, 
individuals sort themselves into arrangements that are thought to signal 
to the state the appropriate conditions for the distribution of these social 
goods; the central and most essential of these conditions are permanence 
and exclusivity. These qualities justify the reciprocal package of rights 
and responsibilities that characterize marital status. 
 188. As described in one influential taxonomy, marriage is comprised of “two characteristics: the 
expressive legitimacy that comes from the public institution of marriage; and the panoply of material 
benefits, both economic and non-economic, that the marital relationship confers.” Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005). 
 189. Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 235, 258 (2011) (canvassing “vast” array of privileges and obligations). 
 190. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), United Sates v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
 191. Similarly, I note that others have spoken eloquently about a couple’s interest in keeping their 
marriage intact as they move. Given the ease with which those concerns are encompassed within Due 
Process and Equal Protection frameworks, I focus here on the state interests in maintaining its 
regulatory authority over a couple that moves away. Joseph William Singer,  
Same-sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R & C.L 1, 38 
(2005) (describing the Court’s view that “it is crucial to have a single answer to the question of whether 
a person is or is not married in a federal union.”). 
 192. Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 41 (2011). 
 193. Id. at 5–6 (describing the family as “a legally regulated private welfare system.”); see also 
Anne L. Alsott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 3 (2010) 
(explaining the ways in which family support obligations function as a form of social insurance); 
Appleton, supra note 123, at 966 (describing the privatization of dependency as “the essence of family 
lawa goal that animates the field and runs through its different elements.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 
225, 229 (2004) (“Through marriage, government can delegate to the family some of society’s 
collective responsibility for dependency.”).  
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Professor Rosenbury emphasizes the state’s interest in the 
distribution of material goods, asserting that “the ultimate value 
underlying legal recognition of family” is the privatization of dependency. 
As she elaborates,  
the government affirmatively recognizes certain intimate relationships, to 
the exclusion of others, in order to incentivize individuals to privately 
address the dependencies that often arise when adults care for children and 
for one another . . . . [E]ven as our understandings of family roles and 
composition have changed, legal recognition of family status remains 
rooted in the privatization of dependency . . . . The government therefore 
recognizes and bestows benefits on families so that they will serve a private 
welfare function, minimizing reliance on state and federal coffers.194 
A state’s interest in distributing social goods, managing dependence, 
and enforcing legal obligations seems attenuated for couples no longer in 
its territorial reach: why not let the next domicile decide whether to 
recognize the marriage, or instead risk derogation of familial 
responsibility and the ensuing depletion of the state’s coffers? At first 
blush it would seem that one domicile has to yield to the next, and that 
only the current domicile can claim these kinds of interests. However, 
that is to overlook something essential about the nature of marriage and 
what is required to effectively advance the state interest in privatized 
dependency. The first domicile’s interests are in conferring a permanent 
status, or at least one that cannot be undone without a fair amount of 
state involvement.195 Perhaps paradoxically, divorce proceedings 
confirm the permanence of marital status by requiring couples to engage 
the state’s judicial machinery in ways that are not only extensive and 
intrusive but anomalous in legal culture.196 Permanence is to marriage 
what finality is to judgments: even the departures from the premise 
confirm it. It is this permanence, as aspirational as that might seem in 
the era of no-fault divorce, which is essential to the meaningful 
advancement of the very interests that motivate the state to administer a 
marriage regime. 
Marriage as a “legally regulated private welfare system” depends on 
its supposed permanence.197 This characteristic both provides moral 
authority for the state’s explicit favoring of marital relationships (this 
couple deserves special benefits because they have made a unique and 
enduring commitment to each other) and provides the rough proxy for 
 194. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 
1866–67 (2014). 
 195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (emphasizing the state’s monopoly on the 
dissolution of marriage). 
 196. Even in a post-fault world, the specification of financial and parental responsibility requires 
extraordinary state involvement. See Scott, supra note 193, at 229 (“[W]ithin a properly structured 
legal framework, even marriages that end in divorce can serve quite effectively to provide a measure 
of financial security for dependent family members.”).  
 197. Halley, supra note 192, at 5–6. 
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reliable mutual support that the system depends on (it is more or less 
reasonable to assume that this couple’s needs will be met by each other, 
rather than the state, because of the exclusive and enduring nature of the 
commitment they’ve made to each other). 
It is essential to understand that these expectations of permanence 
and exclusivity are not only the justifications for the marriage regime; 
they are intended, through intense social pressure, to shape the behavior 
of the couples within marriage. The permanence expectation is critical to 
reinforcing the daily conduct on which the system of privatized 
dependence reliesincluding the pooling of resources, the possibility for 
specialization in the types of labor that each spouse performs, and the 
investment of resources in the family enterprise rather than in pursuing 
individual endeavors. To allow that marital status might be contingent, 
unpredictable, and vulnerable to uncontrollable forces beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the state where the couple makes their home 
when they marry is a contraction of the first state’s authority to 
instantiate and oversee an institution whose functioning depends on 
expectations of permanence. 
Perhaps all of this seems somewhat abstract, but the question is how 
it fares in contrast to a state’s interest in refusing to recognize the 
marriage of a migratory couple. And let us, for now, take the marriage of 
an uncle and niece to avoid the specific political valence of interracial or 
same-sex marriage. No matter how sincerely, vigorously, even justifiably 
the second state may believe that the union in question is deficient, 
harmful, or simply ineligible for formal state sanction; no matter how 
appropriate the state’s conviction that the union ought not to be an 
administrative unit for the private welfare system, the second domicile 
cannot prevent the financial, social, sexual, and emotional joinder that 
the couple has already undertaken in reliance on the legal status they 
achieved in their first domicile. Faced with an existing marriage from 
another state, a state is simply not in the position to achieve the 
objectives it seeks to pursue when deciding whether to initiate a marriage 
in the first place. To borrow from a classic of the domestic relations 
literature, the second state does not have a meaningful opportunity to 
perform a channeling function for a migratory couple seeking recognition 
of their relationship.198 By the time the second state’s legal framework 
becomes relevant to the couple they have already entered into the 
institution of marriage; their behavior and expectations have been 
shaped, at least in part, by that institution’s norms. The second state’s 
refusal instead serves an expressive function: it communicates moral 
 198. Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 496 (1992) 
(describing the channeling function as the aspect of family law that encourages and incentivizes people 
to enter into and sustain institutions thought of as socially beneficial, and to forego those thought of 
as harmful).  
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disapproval of the couple’s relationship. The second state’s expressive 
interest, in my view, should rank beneath the first state’s interest in the 
perpetual reinforcement of the permanence norms that are essential to 
the entire regime. 
The next step is to see that the differential weight of the respective 
state interests is something that matters for horizontal federalism; 
having discerned that the first state has a stronger regulatory claim by 
virtue of its superior interests, this understanding should inform the 
interstate relations issues of Article IV. We are now in a position to return 
to the appropriate role for Congress to play. Is Congress so powerful 
under the Effects clause of Article IV that it can mandate a choice of law 
regime that subordinates the interests of the state with the stronger claim 
to regulatory authority?199 I posit that the answer is no, but readers need 
not agree with that conclusion to see how laborious this inquiry would 
have been, requiring a fairly profound engagement with the nature of 
legal marriage and the state interests in regulating it. 
Professor Metzger’s discussion reveals a central insight for 
horizontal federalism that goes well beyond the question of Congress’s 
role in managing interstate relations: that a satisfactory interstate 
recognition scheme will be predicated on a clear-eyed assessment of what 
the respective state interests are. And the thesis, whether right or wrong, 
adds an important dimension to evaluating the view of conflicts scholars 
that the application of Full Faith and Credit to interstate marriage 
recognition was conclusively a dead letter or a “feckless” simplification. 
Instead, it suggests exactly the opposite: perhaps there were simply too 
many open questionsthorny ones, implicating the complicated 
multilateral relationship between Congress, federal courts, state courts, 
and state legislaturesfor this to be the most sensible avenue for the 
Court’s resolution to the same-sex marriage controversy.200 
Against this backdrop, we have a fresh and entirely different 
perspective on the supposed irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to questions of interstate marriage recognition. It is true that the 
role of the Clause in resolving such disputes has so far been virtually 
nonexistent, but not because there is something categorically or 
conceptually inapt about it, or because there is any sort of settled 
consensus on how marriage licenses fit into what otherwise seems to be 
 199. See Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations 
Conflict Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063 (1999).  
 200. See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1392 (2012): 
[T]o constitutionally eliminate the major interstate conflicts, courts would have to 
simultaneously hold: (1) that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires interstate recognition 
of marriages of its own force, (2) that Congress cannot (pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause) alter that recognition rule, and (3) that this rule cannot be affected by the public 
policy exception that states have long exercised. 
AVIEL-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 3:58 PM 
764 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:721 
a binary scheme dividing laws from judgments and enforcing only the 
latter. Rather, the work the Clause might do in managing interstate 
marriage recognition has been done by other doctrines, allowing the 
Court to avoid complicated questions about Congressional power to 
override the default commands of Article IV, and to do so in a way that 
lacks sensitivity to the actual weight and nature of the state interests 
involved. In light of this past, the question that naturally emerges is 
whether the Clause has any possible future. I briefly take this on in the 
next Section. 
III.  FAITHFUL UNIONS OF THE FUTURE 
I start from the premise that we are unlikely to have seen the last of 
our national controversies over state marriage policy. While we might 
have difficulty forecasting when the next major controversy will unfold 
or which social movements it will encompass, I nonetheless posit that it 
is premature to declare that the constitutionalization of marriage has 
reached its endpoint. There would be some hubris in doing so, 
considering the speed with which marriage equality claims for same-sex 
couples went from facing dismissal for lack of a federal question to 
successful articulations of a constitutional right.201 That said, is there 
reason to think that the future of Full Faith and Credit will be any 
different than its past? Under what conditions would the Clause be 
sufficiently useful to overcome the obstacles previously identified to its 
application and elaboration? 
In light of the approach I have taken so far, it might seem that the 
Clause has practical importance in a truly limited category of 
marriagesthose that might be ineligible for recognition under the place 
of celebration rule as contrary to the forum state’s strong public policy, 
but where we do not see the sort of impermissible animus that draws in 
the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees. While that is true, it is 
essential to understand that this is something we can identify more 
readily in retrospect than ex ante. Unconstitutional animus is not a 
terrain with fixed boundariesit is contested, evolving, and responsive 
to social change. While the chronology of marriage equality seems to 
reinforce the assumption that we can expect the Fourteenth Amendment 
to do most of the work in policing state marriage policy, it also reveals 
how long that might take, and the potential for backlash to threaten or at 
least complicate forward progress.202 We might indeed find it useful to 
call upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause while the Fourteenth 
Amendment principles are being worked out. 
 201. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing gay couple’s challenge to exclusionary 
marriage law “for want of a substantial federal question”). 
 202. See Klarman, supra note 106, at 450.  
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Consider polygamy, for example. Some have suggested that plural 
marriage is the “next frontier” in family law,203 and serious efforts have 
been made to examine and critique the currently universal requirement 
that no more than two people may join in state-sanctioned matrimony.204 
Although reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, there is reason to 
believe that polyamorous families are increasingly common.205 Public 
opinion on the issue is changing perceptibly,206 reflecting what one 
commentator describes as “an increasingly libertarian or laissez-faire 
view that many younger Americans take toward sex, marriage, and family 
life.”207 In response to a constitutional challenge brought by the 
polygamous family portrayed in the television show Sister Wives, Utah 
walked back enforcement of its criminal bigamy prohibitions, publicly 
announcing that it would only pursue bigamy prosecutions against those 
who induced a spouse to marry through misrepresentation or were 
suspected of collateral crimes such as fraud or abuse.208 Can we imagine 
a future in which a state legalizes plural marriage, and then a migrating 
“throuple” might seek to have their marriage recognized in another state? 
Difficulties arise immediately in using the issue of plural marriage 
to suggest that there may be work to do in the future for Full Faith and 
Credit. First, as to what we might call the rule of two, there is absolutely 
no divergence in state law at the moment, making the prospect of 
interstate recognition issues remote at best. Of course, this was also true 
of same-sex marriage until 2003, when Massachusetts became the first 
state to strike down prohibitions on same-sex marriage as invalid under 
the equality and liberty guarantees of the state constitution. Perhaps we 
ought to recognize that momentum was already gathering a few years 
 203. See MARK GOLDFEDER, LEGALIZING PLURAL MARRIAGE: THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FAMILY LAW 
(Brandeis University Press, 2017).  
 204. See Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be A Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to 
Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977 (2015); Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating 
Polygamy in America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 54 (2014); Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating 
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961 
(2010) (considering commercial partnerships as a source of inspiration for the regulatory challenges 
of marriage multiplicity); see also Hadar Aviram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of 
Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 269 
(2015).  
 205. ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR, INSIDE MULTIPLE-PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS 
AND FAMILIES xi (2014). She also notes, however, that not all such families would seek legal 
formalization of these relationships even if permitted to do so. 
 206. Nate Carlisle, Poll: American Public Finds Polygamy More Acceptable but Is Still Opposed, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 3, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/blogs/polygamy/2584240-
155/poll-american-public-finds-polygamy-more (a 2015 Gallup poll found that a mere sixteen percent 
of American find polygamy “morally acceptable,” but as one reporter observed, that number was up 
from five percent in 2006not a “tidal wave,” but a needle moving perceptibly.).  
 207. Samantha Allen, Polygamy Is More Popular than Ever, DAILY BEAST (June 2, 2015, 5:15 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/02/polygamy-is-more-popular-than-ever.html. 
 208. Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016).  
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prior, when Vermont decided in 1999 that gay couples could not be 
excluded from the set of legal rights and government benefits extended 
to heterosexual couples.209 Even if we set the clock back to 1993, prior to 
the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin,210 we can see that 
interstate recognition issues may arise fairly rapidly out of a landscape 
that has not seemed fertile for them. In fact, looking back to 1993 
illustrates two seemingly conflicting points: while twenty-two years 
seems like a short period for such a major transformation in law and 
society, it was plenty of time for a constitutionalized interstate 
recognition scheme to have been practically useful.211 
The other difficulty is not so much with legal status as with social 
practice: how prevalent are the various forms of plural relationships with 
marriage-like commitments? More precisely, how prevalent would it be 
absent government disapproval of such relationships?212 Every time I 
teach Family Law I ask my students whether people they know would 
practice plural marriage if the government permitted them to do so. 
Students struggle to discern whether the rule of two is foreclosing 
arrangements that people would otherwise choose, or rather reflecting 
durable and fairly widespread social preferences that exist independently 
of law. The answer is probably both, as law and norms reflect and 
reinforce each other. The point is that the rule of two strikes people as 
less exclusionary than other marriage restrictions simply because of the 
perception that fewer people feel meaningfully affected by its 
constraints.213 It can seem premature to assess whether polygamy is 
likely to be our next national marriage controversy, as we can hardly 
imagine the coalition that will call for it. But that puts us right back to the 
point about interstate recognition issues arising in ways that feel 
unexpected during periods of profound social transformation.214 
 209. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
 210. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (court determining that the law was a gender based 
restriction and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny). 
 211. As one scholar has observed, “in constitutional controversies, public opinion can shift 
rapidly.” Otter, supra note 204, at 2042.  
 212. RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE 65 (2015). Noting the prevalence of 
traditional, religiously motivated patriarchal polygamy, Otter posits that “the polygynous 
relationships in contemporary America are but a subset of the wide range of plural marriages that 
would probably exist if states were to legalize polygamy . . .” 
 213. Arin Greenwood, Who Are ‘The Polyamorists Next Door’? Q & A with Author Elisabeth Sheff, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 5, 2014, 10:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/03/05/elisabeth-sheff-polyamory_n_4898961.html. As one expert on polyamorous families 
has noted, “poly people are not organized politically around the issue like folks in same-sex 
relationships have organized around marriage equality because many polys can marry in dyads and 
get the goodies that come with marriage even without poly marriage.”  
 214. Indeed, one account of marriage equality posits that “the LGBT movement was brought to the 
fight for marriage equality by the anticipatory countermobilization of social conservatives who 
opposed same-sex marriage before there was a realistic prospect that it would be recognized by the 
courts or political actors.” Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an 
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Plural marriage is a useful example for our purposes precisely 
because the application of Fourteenth Amendment principles does not, 
at least from the current vantage point, yield obvious conclusions. While 
a thorough assessment of the rule of two’s constitutionality is well beyond 
the scope of this project, I offer a few quick observations. First, the rule 
of two burdens (at least) three different groups whose demographic and 
ideological distance from each other can hardly be overstated: 
fundamentalist Mormon sects cast out by the Church of Latter Day 
Saints;215 Muslim communities, in turn comprised of immigrants from 
West Africa and the Middle East216 as well as  
African-American members of orthodox congregations in urban areas 
such as Philadelphia;217 but also avowedly secular groups whose very 
interest in plural marriage lies in resisting compulsory sexual norms.218 
The first two groups are religious minorities, whose practice of plural 
marriage is inextricable from a commitment to traditionalistand 
explicitly patriarchalnorms regarding gender and sexuality. The third 
is a group we could describe as a sexual minority, allied with and 
sympathetic to queer politics,219 whose attitude towards sexual 
relationships might be considered, at the very least “rebellious.”220 To 
reflect on how little these communities have in common, other than their 
rejection of compulsory dyadic marriage, is to understand the challenges 
that lie ahead for courts trying to examine whether the rule of two 
burdens a “discrete and insular minority” in a way that ought to trigger 
heightened scrutiny.221 Will the fact that plural marriage is practiced by 
such a diverse set of communities make it more likely to be considered 
conduct rather than status? 
Perhaps the anti-animus principle can circumvent some of this 
difficulty, by focusing the inquiry on the intent to disparage rather than 
the social and political profile of the group being burdened; but still, 
courts will have to contend with a set of justifications states can offer in 
Anticipatory Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 449, 449 (2014). 
 215. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008).  
 216. Andrea Useem, What to Expect When You’re Expecting a Co-Wife, SLATE (July 24, 2007, 
12:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2170977/; Pauline Bartolone, For These Muslims, Polygamy is 
an Option, S. F. GATE (Aug. 5, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/ 
c/a/2007/08/05/INTBR8OJC1.DTL; Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly 
Engage in Polygamy, NPR (May 27, 2008, 12:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=90857818. 
 217. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Philly’s Black Muslims Increasingly Turn to Polygamy, NPR.COM 
(May 28, 2008, 10:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90886407. 
 218. See Aviram & Leachman, supra note 204, at 375.  
 219. See Aviram & Leachman, supra note 204, at 375.  
 220. Greenwood, supra note 213 (noting the race and class privilege prevalent among the 
polyamorous families in her research, and positing that “social privilege makes it safer to be openly 
sexually unconventional.”).  
 221. See Carpenter, supra note 121, at page 184.  
AVIEL-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 3:58 PM 
768 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:721 
defense of the rule of two that do not convey impermissible animus as 
transparently as other prohibitions have done. Among the justifications 
scholars have proffered include the concern that polygamy, at least as 
practiced in traditionalist religious communities, is inherently 
oppressive to women, and that the government is entitled to issue 
marriage licenses to relationships that are more likely to advance gender 
equality.222 Additional concerns include the administrative hurdles that 
would attend the extension of marriage benefits to what one critic calls 
“ludicrously large marriages.”223 To be sure, other scholars have labored 
passionately to critique these justifications and have done so 
persuasively, allowing us a preview of how contested the landscape is and 
will likely continue to be. The point here is neither to judge the respective 
merit of the two positions on normative grounds nor to make predictive 
claims about how the courts will ultimately rule, but to think about what 
this means for the range of doctrinal instruments that might be applied 
to questions of marriage federalism. 
The uncertainty about how the Fourteenth Amendment claims will 
be received as they wend their way through state and federal courts, and 
the hesitation the Court is likely to manifest in deciding whether and 
when to weigh in, suggest an opportunity to consider a constitutionally 
obligatory interstate recognition scheme under the purview of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. Especially if Congress sits this one out, allowing 
for a direct examination of the Clause’s self-executing requirements 
rather than the more challenging assessment of Congress’s override 
power, courts might finally find reason to break new ground under 
Article IV, setting out recognition obligations that states have to each 
other in the face of pervasive disagreement over marriage policy. 
CONCLUSION 
We live in a moment of intense preoccupation with both marriage 
and federalism, one that is likely to persist well beyond the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Obergefell. The decision served to reify marriage as a 
site of enormous cultural significance, an appropriate institution within 
which to fight over social meaning and its reflection in law. These battles 
are fought state by state, against a backdrop of unprecedented geographic 
mobility, raising profound questions not only about how states relate to 
their own citizens but how states relate to each other. Because if it is true 
that states have an interest in marriages they have created, an idea often 
invoked but less frequently examined, then interstate marriage 
 222. See John Witte, Jr., Why Two in One Flesh? The Western Case for Monogamy over 
Polygamy, 64 EMORY L.J. 1675 (2015).  
 223. Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law, 
120 ETHICS 302, 310 (2010).  
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recognition is a matter not only of individual rights but also of state 
sovereignty. 
And yet, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the constitutional 
command that is seemingly most suited to managing marriage 
federalism, has never been called into action. This Article first suggests 
that this warrants explanation, and then endeavors to provide one. It 
offers an account of contingent doctrinal evolution, demonstrating that 
the work the Clause might do in regulating interstate marriage 
recognition has been done by other doctrines. The Article has shown that 
the historically generous place of celebration rule, and the increasingly 
robust protection for marriage decision-making provided by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, has so far covered most of the terrain. 
But it also explains why the Clause might nonetheless be useful for 
the marriage controversies of the future. Polygamy, for example, has 
already sparked a sustained discussion in the legal scholarship as well as 
popular media, with some forcefully arguing that its legalization is 
compelled by the same principles of liberty and equality upon which 
marriage equality for same-sex couples is grounded. Others however, 
have maintained that plural marriage is different and harmful in 
constitutionally significant ways, and ought to remain outside of the 
realm of state sanctioned marriage. The ultimate resolution of this and 
other marriage controversies is far from apparent where we currently 
stand. The anti-animus principles that drove forward marriage equality 
are highly dynamic; they reflect and respond to social change in an 
iterative process that is neither linear, nor predictable, nor 
instantaneous. While this unfolds for any given marriage controversy, 
over a period that might take decades, we would benefit by having in 
place a working interstate recognition scheme with constitutional 
parameters. 
It is beyond the scope of this project to lay out the precise contours 
of such a regime, other than to assert that it should be grounded on a 
searching inquiry into the respective state interests at stake. As we 
observed when examining Congress’s authority under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, state sovereignty interests run in both directions. Upon 
examination, however, these interests are more compelling for the state 
that first exercised regulatory authority over a domiciled couple and less 
so for a subsequent state to which the couple has moved, suggesting a 
reasoned basis to favor the first domicile. The essential point at this stage 
is to acknowledge that a constitutionalized set of recognition 
obligationsnon-abrogable and not subject to refusal on substantive 
policy groundsoffers a lot of promise for strengthening our 
commitment to faithful unions, both marital and national. 
 
 
